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ABSTRACT
When creators and innovators take up a new task, they face a
world of existing creative works, inventions, and ideas, some of
which are governed by intellectual property (IP) rights. This presents
a choice: Should the creator pay to license those rights? Or, alterna-
tively, should the creator undertake to innovate around them? Our
Article formulates this “build on/build around decision” as the
fundamental feature of sequential creativity, and it maps a number
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of factors—some legal, some contextual—that affect how creators are
likely to decide between building on existing IP or building around
it. Importantly, creators are influenced by more than just formal IP
rights. We identify three other sets of factors—(1) Technological and
Artistic, (2) Market, and (3) Creator—that can also affect the path of
sequential innovation by encouraging either building on or building
around. Our focus on creators’ build on/build around decisions of-
fers a richer, but more complex, account of the nature of sequential
innovation and, in so doing, yields insights into its efficient legal
regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Taylor Swift, an admired and popular singer-songwriter,
released her fifth album, 1989. The following year, Ryan Adams,
also an admired and popular singer-songwriter, released his fif-
teenth album, 1989. Adams’s 1989 was a song-by-song imitation of
Swift’s 1989. It may seem odd that Adams would release an album
of another singer-songwriter’s material. But in popular music, this
is not unusual. Popular musicians often cover other musicians’
songs. Indeed, as we shall see, copyright law is set up to allow them
wide freedom to do so.1 It is unusual that Adams decided to cover an
entire Taylor Swift album, rather than a single song.2 But Adams’s
decision to engage in wider imitation than is customary leads to the
question this Article explores: Under what conditions would a
person or a firm decide to build on already-existing creativity rather
than attempt to create something new?
This question arises across the entire range of creative and in-
novative work. Imagine that a smartphone company is considering
updating its touchscreens for an upcoming product release. To do so,
it has two options: license another firm’s patented technology or
develop its own technology that does not infringe the other firm’s
patents. Or consider a movie studio that wants to produce a summer
blockbuster. It can purchase the rights for an existing copyrighted
story, or it can have its own writers create a new story. How should
the smartphone company and the movie studio decide what to do?
Whether we are talking about Ryan Adams, a smartphone
company, or a movie studio, the answer is (conceptually) the same
and pretty simple. The actors should choose whichever strategy
maximizes the ratio of benefits to costs.3 The hard part is doing that
calculus. As this Article demonstrates, focusing on how intellectual
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. This is not unprecedented. See Heidi Vanderlee, The 10 Best Full-Album Covers of All
Time, FLAVORWIRE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://flavorwire.com/62353/reinvention-as-flattery-the-
best-full-album-covers-of-all-time [https://perma.cc/F55E-EKM5] (mentioning Beck’s recording
of “The Velvet Underground & Nico” and Rufus Wainwright’s version of Judy Garland at
Carnegie Hall).
3. See infra Part I.C.
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property (IP) law affects cumulative innovation is not sufficient.4
Doing the calculus right requires a broader model. This Article pro-
vides such a model and demonstrates how policymakers can use it.
Understanding the costs and benefits of building on existing
works and technologies, versus undertaking new creative or inven-
tive efforts, is deeply complicated. We refer to a creator’s decision
whether to license preexisting IP or strike out on its own as the
build on/build around (O/A) decision, and it is a decision antecedent
to almost all sequential innovation. A downstream5 creator faced
with a world of existing IP rights must choose whether to design
around those rights or whether to pay a license fee and borrow from
them.6 The O/A decision involves weighing a wide range of factors,
including the scope of existing IP rights, the costs of designing
around those existing rights,7 and a host of nonlegal, contextual
factors that may point toward building on or building around in
particular instances.
This Article’s account of the O/A decision, and the ways in which
it drives sequential innovation, draws from and extends two related
but distinct literatures. First, a number of scholars have focused on
the influence of IP law on sequential innovation. They have high-
lighted the ways in which changes to the breadth or scope of IP
rights affect the pace and direction of creativity and innovation.8
4. See infra Part II.
5. “Downstream” creators are ones who are considering licensing or designing around
“upstream” rights. Of course, all upstream creators are, or were, downstream of other cre-
ators. For simplicity, we focus on individual interactions.
6. As we explain in Part I, what we call “building around” does not always result in
artistic or technological improvements, nor does what we call “building on” always result in
stasis. Often creators design around existing rights, but produce no new knowledge, and
downstream creators often build on existing rights because they plan to improve them. See
infra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1581 (2003) (“In the last twenty years, legal and economic scholarship has provided
valuable evidence about the complex process of innovation and how the patent system affects
innovation.”); Matthew J. Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A. Lemley, Foreseeability
in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1050 (2001) (discussing the law and policy
arguments in favor of design-arounds in patent law); Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around
Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1346 (2015) (arguing the patent law concept of “inventing
around” also exists in the copyright context); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1056 (1997) (discussing how parties’
willingness to pay or license depends on multiple factors); Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
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This research has not, however, typically looked beyond the influ-
ence of IP laws to consider the host of other factors, described in this
Article, that influence sequential innovation.
A second cohort of scholars has applied concepts derived from
Ronald Coase’s seminal “theory of the firm” to innovation relation-
ships.9 The theory of the firm literature analyzes the factors that
determine whether parties to a transaction vertically integrate, with
one buying the other, or operate as separate entities.10 This is
known as the “make-or-buy” decision. In the innovation context, this
approach inquires into the factors that influence whether a would-
be innovator will integrate its innovation activities into the firm or
contract externally to obtain them.11
Although this line of inquiry motivates our own questions, the
existing theory of the firm literature has not previously focused on
sequential innovation. Indeed, the existing literature typically
frames innovation as a one-step process, starting from the premise
that a firm desires to innovate and must decide whether to do so in-
house or to pay another firm to innovate for it.12 For example, a car
company needing new braking technology can either develop that
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880-84 (1990)
(evaluating the historical effect of patent availability on innovation and industry structure
in several industries); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking,
and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1583 (2009) (analyzing the effect of
secondary markets for patents).
9. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of
Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1671-88 (2009) (analyzing how property
rights and covenants not to compete shape the boundaries of technology-intensive firms); Dan
L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004) (analyzing doctrines
of patent and copyright law under the property-based theory of the firm); Peter Lee, Trans-
cending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Tech-
nology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1508-09 (2012) (discussing the impact of tacit
knowledge and the theory of the firm on markets, relationships, and organization); Robert P.
Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of Transaction Costs, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 145, 145 (2011) (arguing that “disaggregated production of IP-covered works are worth
the cost” because they serve important normative values).
10. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the
Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213 (1993) (comparing Coase’s theory to contempor-
aneous theories and exploring the impact of the theory of the firm on corporate law).
11. See Burk, supra note 9, at 4.
12. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innova-
tion: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 434 (2009)
(discussing how contracting parties manage innovation and IP rights).
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technology using its own engineers, or it can contract with another
firm to develop that technology for them.
This is an incomplete way to model innovation. The world is full
of existing innovations, many covered by one form of IP or another.
A model of innovation should account for existing IP rights by inte-
grating (1) the sequential nature of innovation,13 (2) the fact that
innovators often confront existing IP rights,14 and (3) the fact that
would-be innovators face a decision whether to borrow from these
existing rights (usually by licensing them), or innovate in ways that
fall outside the scope of those existing rights.15 With this Article, we
present such a model.
Accordingly, in this Article we push the inquiry back in time, to
when the firm or other creator is deciding whether to innovate at
all, or simply to license existing IP rights.16 We are interested in
how the car company in our earlier example decides if developing a
new braking system is worthwhile in the first place (regardless of
whether the development is done internally or externally). In other
words, before we can answer the question of whether a firm should
contract with another to produce an innovation or whether it should
innovate in-house, we first need to know whether the innovation
will take place at all, or whether the firm will borrow from an exist-
ing idea instead. In a world of existing innovations and associated
IP rights, virtually all make-or-buy decisions are preceded by O/A
decisions.
This Article highlights the major factors that influence whether
a creator or inventor is likely to build on existing works and ideas
or build around them to a new solution. We have organized these
factors into four categories: (1) Legal, (2) Technological and Artistic,
(3) Market, and (4) Creator. Each of the four categories contains a
number of factors that can affect the O/A decision. For example,
with respect to the Technological and Artistic category, would-be
creators may have to consider, among other things, the maturity of
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. As we explain in more detail below, not everything that we label “building around”
produces new value, and not everything that we label “building on” involves exact duplication.
Building around may produce redundant ideas, while building on may occur in furtherance
of new developments. See infra Part I.C.
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the industry or medium, the degree to which downstream creations
depend on upstream inputs, and the importance of tacit know-
ledge.17 While we have assigned all legal factors that influence O/A
decisions to one category, we have split the nonlegal factors into
three categories. The main difference between these three categories
is that factors that influence the O/A decision directly through a
price signal are assigned to the Market category, while factors that
influence the O/A decision through the behaviors and preferences of
the innovators are assigned to the Creator category. When con-
straints arise from the characteristics of a particular technological
or artistic environment and influence O/A decisions, we assign them
to the Technological and Artistic category. We have used this
categorization because the channels through which factors from the
four categories influence O/A decision differ substantially and the
policy responses to these influences may also differ between cate-
gories.18
Whether firms and individuals make O/A decisions well or poorly
is not simply a matter of their own success or failure—society as a
whole is affected. If, for example, a pharmaceutical firm underesti-
mates how difficult developing a new drug that does not infringe
existing IP rights will be, it will waste resources on innovation and,
in so doing, increase the price of the resulting drug and perhaps
delay its arrival. Had its calculations been correct, the firm should
have built its new drug upon existing IP rights and acquired the
necessary licenses to do so. Similar problems arise if creators are
inappropriately risk averse and pay to license rights that they could
have easily built around. The mistaken O/A decision will result in
a higher cost to produce new work. If the mistake is big enough, the
new work may not be produced at all.
These examples only scratch the surface; O/A decisions pervade
all areas of creativity and innovation. Just as musicians have to
decide whether to borrow or create melodies and progressions, com-
puter programmers must decide whether to borrow or innovate code.
Yet despite the centrality of O/A decisions to the success of innova-
tion, the factors affecting them have never been systematically
identified and explained.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part VI.
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Our focus on how context influences sequential innovation has
three important policy implications. First, our account of the O/A
decision helps explain how regulation may or may not influence the
nature of sequential innovation by affecting the behavior of up-
stream and downstream creators.19 Legal regulation, particularly in
the form of changes to IP rights, can affect how downstream
creators value borrowing from existing rights or designing around
them. But the same regulation can also affect how upstream
creators value and price their rights.20 As we show in Part VI, the
ultimate result of the regulation will be based on the difference
between the magnitudes of the effects on upstream versus down-
stream creators.
Second, our analysis demonstrates that the enterprise of encour-
aging innovation through the grant of legal rights to control IP is
much more complicated than the relatively straightforward IP
incentive story suggests.21 Because nonlegal factors influence so
much about sequential innovation, a change to the law aimed at
encouraging innovation may have effects that are difficult to predict.
Accordingly, in order to engage in effective policy making, we must
develop a richer and more accurate understanding of the skein of
factors and relationships that affect sequential innovation.
Finally, we show that seemingly disparate questions in innova-
tion policy are in fact connected, and the link between them is
sequential innovation.22 For example, the appropriate scope for fair
use in copyright law is, in our view, often a question of what sort of
rule for sequential innovation we want. Fair use rules determine
which parties should get to produce other versions of a copyrighted
work and whether they require licenses. We can readily see that a
host of other nonlegal factors will affect this particular sequential
innovation question. If, for example, consumers in some market
have pronounced tastes for groundbreaking innovation versus
derivative borrowing, then we might expect to see relatively little
building on within that market even if the fair use doctrine were
broadened to permit it. Or, imagine a market in which creators have
19. See infra Part VI.D.
20. See infra Part VI.B.
21. See infra Part VI.D.
22. See infra Part VI.D.
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a particular behavioral response to risk. Let us hypothesize that
creators are significantly overconfident about their ability to engage
in groundbreaking innovation. Here too we might broaden the scope
of the fair use doctrine and still see little effect on a market in which
building on is comparatively rare. The overarching point is this: no
matter what your goal is in regulating sequential innovation, no
matter what values you are seeking to optimize, it is not enough to
pull the levers that IP law presents. To understand how particular
legal interventions are likely to affect sequential innovation, you
have to know more about the context in which sequential innovation
occurs, in all of its particular forms.
Accordingly, IP law and scholarship should be reoriented to con-
sider legal interventions in the context of sequential innovation.23
This inquiry is necessarily both more particularistic than theories
of sequential innovation that would focus on legal interventions
without attention to context, and overwhelmingly more empirical
than theoretical.24 Although more complex, only by considering
sequential innovation in context can we understand how to effec-
tively influence O/A decisions—an issue which should be at the
heart of any policy on how to govern cumulative innovation pro-
cesses.
The Article proceeds in six Parts. In Part I, we introduce the con-
cept of O/A decisions and provide some context for understanding
how creators approach them, using the existing literature discussed
above. Parts II through V map out four categories of factors that
influence O/A decisions and analyze how they affect whether a
creator or innovator is likely to build on or build around. In Part VI,
we synthesize this analysis and examine the complex interplay of
the contextual factors that drive sequential innovation.
I. CUMULATIVE INNOVATION AND CREATOR DECISION-MAKING
A. Innovation, Contracts, and Firms
In his 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase
wondered why we ever see the emergence of firms in a market
23. See infra Part VI.D.
24. See infra Part VI.C.
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economy.25 If a producer needed a particular part to make an auto-
mobile, for example, why did it not simply contract with a supplier
to produce the part rather than produce the part itself?26 To Coase,
markets based on individual buyers and sellers could, in theory at
least, create goods more efficiently than larger, vertically integrated
firms.27 His explanation for the existence of firms, then, turned on
the role of transaction costs that hinder market exchanges.28 In
some cases, the difficulties of finding and negotiating with suppliers
increased a firm’s costs more than investing in the management and
other capacities required to simply make the part itself.29
At its core, Coase’s seminal article attempts to model how pro-
ducers approach “make or buy” decisions.30 In Coase’s model, the
decision to make or buy, and concomitantly, the “boundaries of the
firm” (for example, the size or degree of integration of firms), is
determined by the balance of costs associated with purchasing goods
on the market versus making them internally.31 As market transac-
tion costs increase—relative to the costs of organizing activity with-
in firms—so too will firm size. Firms will tend to “make” rather than
“buy,” and will expand accordingly.32
Coase’s approach has been revisited and elaborated throughout
the twentieth century, as economists and legal scholars have sought
to understand the kinds of costs that may lead producers to inte-
25. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (“Yet, having regard
to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on
without any organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any organisation?”).
26. Cf. id. at 390.
27. As Dan Burk explains, “Modern theories of the firm ... have evolved in order to explain
and justify the presence of organizational hierarchies within free market systems.” Burk,
supra note 9, at 4.
28. See Coase, supra note 25, at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish
a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”).
29. See id. at 390-91 (“The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each
exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account.”).
30. Cf. id. at 393-94 (“The question which arises is whether it is possible to study the
forces which determine the size of the firm. Why does the entrepreneur not organise one less
transaction or one more?”).
31. See id. at 394-96.
32. Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Princi-
ples, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 407 (2012) (“Economic theories of the firm predict that
the size and structure of firms will be dictated by the transaction costs experienced by the
firm. Firms will decide to either make or buy inputs depending on the relative cost of each
option.”). 
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grate production capabilities within firms.33 Over the past several
years, scholars have further expanded Coase’s fundamental insight
into the realm of innovation and IP.34 They recognized that model-
ing the “make or buy” decision becomes more complex when the
desired outcome is not merely a product or service but rather an
innovation.35 Contracting with a supplier to produce a set number
of widgets manifestly differs from contracting with a supplier to
invent a new molecule or design a new product.36 Agency costs, hold-
up problems, and the design of effective incentives are especially
33. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 691-95 (1986); Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120
(1990); Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms,
93 VA. L. REV. 515, 518 (2007). For example, integrating production may make it easier to
solve agency problems, because firms are better able to monitor otherwise unobservable
behavior (although firms face their own agency problems, and employer monitoring of
employees is quite obviously not costless). See generally George Baker, Robert Gibbons &
Kevin J. Murphy, Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J. ECONOMICS 39
(2002) (exploring the relational contracts within and between firms, and discussing how
integration within firms affects the temptation to renege on those contracts). Firm-based
organization may also enable actors to avoid strategic hold-up problems faced by actors who
make relationship-specific investments that contracts are incapable of adequately controlling
(although again, firms can face these costs as well, but may be better positioned, in general,
to minimize them). See Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in
THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 138, 150-51 (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991); Hart & Moore, supra, at 1120-22. By integrating
the activities of both parties within the same organization, the firm may minimize investment
inefficiencies. Cf. Burk, supra note 9, at 9.
34. For a review, see Anthony J. Casey, Mind Control: Firms and the Production of Ideas,
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1061, 1066-68 (2012); see also Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges,
Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
451, 452-54 (2004); Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 1653, 1656-58; Jonathan M.
Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 787-88, 790-93
(2011); Burk, supra note 9, at 4; Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypoth-
esis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
575, 616-17; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets, and the Value
of Intangible Assets 3-5 (Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) [https://perma.cc/ T4TA-
GENR].
35. Casey, supra note 34, at 1068 (“The prior literature and its focus on a property-rights
theory of the firm is useful but limited because it does not get us very far in analyzing how
the actual creative function is organized.”).
36. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract, Uncer-
tainty, and Innovation, in PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM
223, 226-28 (2011) (describing how the shift from mass-produced standard goods to more
innovative products has led companies to increasingly contract for inputs rather than making
them in-house).
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daunting when so much of what constitutes innovative behavior (for
example, thought) is unobservable, and when the innovation that is
desired is nonexcludable once it is made to appear.37 Writing suf-
ficiently complete contracts to mitigate these problems is well nigh
impossible and certainly extremely expensive.38
Some have observed that in the face of these complexities, IP
rights can play an important role in permitting actors to success-
fully negotiate over innovation and creativity. For example, Paul
Heald and Robert Merges have separately explored how patent
rights can help reduce transaction costs by allowing owners to co-
ordinate investment and solve disclosure problems. That outcome,
according to Coase’s model, should permit more market transactions
and reduce the size of innovative firms relative to a world without
IP.39 Relatedly, Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky have
examined how contract terms, including nondisclosure agreements,
could play an analogous role in solving innovation-related hold-up
problems and reducing the size of innovative firms.40 Dan Burk and
Brett McDonnell provide a somewhat more pessimistic account,
analyzing the competing effects of strong IP rights on cumulative
innovation and noting that, although IP rights may ease hold-up
problems with initial innovation investments, they can also
generate hold-up problems downstream when innovators have to
contract with more and more rights holders.41
37. Cf. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 484
(2005) (“[I]f a transferee firm’s cost of acquiring technology and the risk of post-contractual
misbehavior by the transferor is sufficiently high, the firm may rationally decide to conduct
its own research and development or, perhaps, to acquire the transferor.”). 
38. See Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
297, 299-300 (2014).
39. See Heald, supra note 37, at 476; Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property
Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1485 (2005); see also Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging
Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 231-32 (2012) (noting that IP
is only one of several ways in which actors may solve disclosure problems).
40. Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 1654-55.
41. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 34, at 614 (arguing that broad patent rights “entail[]
new bargaining costs, and at some point bargaining may become so costly that it is not worth
it, and the innovation is stopped in its track. This is the anticommons problem that has
attracted much attention recently.”).
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B. Assuming Innovation Versus Producing It
There is, however, an important way in which the “theory of the
innovative firm” literature is incomplete. The literature often
assumes the existence of innovation as such and concerns itself with
articulating the circumstances in which the innovation will be
produced internally to the firm versus externally on the market.42
For example, the existing literature might ask whether a pharma-
ceutical company will license a new compound from a biotech
company or develop the compound internally via its own research
and development.43
In focusing on these firm versus market questions, the existing
literature faithfully maps the Coaseian model onto innovation. But
in doing so, the literature has thus far overlooked an important
difference between the production of ordinary products and services
compared to the production of innovations.44 The first, and perhaps
most important, decision a potential innovator faces is whether to
innovate in the first place.45 Innovation is not always necessary, even
42. See Casey, supra note 34, at 1062.
43. See Arora & Merges, supra note 34, at 456 (discussing whether a large biotech
company should acquire a smaller company that developed a valuable pharmacological
procedure); Burk & McDonnell, supra note 34, at 591 (“[N]early all of this work has been
targeted toward the interaction between firms, and the decision whether to ‘make or buy’ a
particular specialized input; that is, ultimately, whether to outsource production or whether
to integrate production within a given firm.”). In their writings, Dan Burk and Brett
McDonnell not only look at inputs that are protected by patents or copyrights, but also at
inputs that are covered by trade secrets or trademarks. See id. at 591-605; Dan L. Burk &
Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
345, 346-47 (2009). In this respect, their analysis focuses on whether the existence of IP rights
changes the size and structure of firms, irrespective of whether the IP right covers an
innovation or not.
44. See Casey, supra note 34, at 1062.
45. Anthony Casey notes, “The existing literature focuses on whether a firm that
specializes in post-production development will integrate with the modular unit of actual idea
production however that production might be organized—on where the idea is produced rather
than how it is produced.” Id. For example, in their discussion of whether the large biotech
company Genentech should integrate the smaller producer, Alkermes, Arora and Merges note,
“[T]here is no hard and fast reason why Genentech could not pursue advanced delivery
systems itself.” Arora & Merges, supra note 34, at 456. But they never follow up on this
question in the rest of the analysis. Casey’s approach is the closest to ours, but it too asks a
different question from the one that motivates our concerns. Casey is interested in how “the
modular unit” of creativity will be organized, in particular when creativity may be the
province of a single individual. Casey, supra note 34, at 1064.
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for actors in creative industries.46 Innovation is costly and worth
pursuing only if its benefits exceed its costs. When innovation, or in
our parlance building around, is too costly, actors might make use
of freely available public domain options or license existing ideas
from other parties.47
The existing literature misses another fact that confronts
virtually every potential innovator: people do not just “have” ideas.48
Ideas develop out of preexisting ideas, and those preexisting
ideas—and the property rights attached to them—shape the choices
of later-stage innovators.49 Whether a creator chooses to build
around will often depend on how much of the available “innovation
space” in the field that the potential innovator wishes to enter is
already owned.50
One of this Article’s contributions is the recognition that extend-
ing Coase’s theory of the firm to the context of sequential innovation
requires that we reconfigure the model to place the O/A decision
ahead of the “make or buy” decision. Before we ask whether an actor
will make or buy an innovation, we need to first understand wheth-
er the actor will choose to build around or whether, instead, she will
build on from an existing idea. Only by understanding the nature of
this first decision will we be able to accurately model sequential
innovation. Toward that end, this Article identifies and categorizes
46. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1765-75 (2006) (providing exam-
ples of industries, especially creative industries, with high rates of copying due to low IP-
equilibria).
47. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989).
48. Casey explains:
These frameworks all share the common assumption that the idea is a thing
that exists or can be caused to exist at will. They do not dig into how exactly the
idea comes to exist in the first place or whether that production function re-
quires a particular (sub)organization or is specialized to certain individuals.
Casey, supra note 34, at 1065.
49. See Burk & McDonnell, supra note 34, at 614; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990) (“[T]he very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to
translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.”).
50. Dan L. Burk, Response, The “Creating Around” Paradox, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 118,
121 (2015) (“‘[T]hickets[,]’ in which successively denser entitlements are clustered around an
existing property, crowding out new follow-on creations resembling works already created[,]
...  have been a concern in the patent literature, where dense clusters of exclusivity are be-
lieved to hamper follow-on innovation.”).
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the fundamental drivers of this initial innovation decision.51 We
develop a dynamic theory of the innovative actor,52 in which an
actor’s decision to produce an innovation is not analyzed in isolation,
but in the context of both legal and nonlegal factors that shape the
choice between innovation and borrowing.53 Ultimately, our theory
will help guide scholars and policymakers regarding how to
influence O/A decisions in a way calculated to optimize creative
output.
C. The Nature of Decisions to Build On or Build Around
Our account of the build on/build around decision is based on a
set of simplifying assumptions that mirror those in the theory of the
firm literature. In our model, one or more upstream creators have
preexisting IP rights in their works or inventions. A downstream
creator has a new idea that she believes will make a valuable
contribution to the market.54 To accomplish the idea, she has two
options: (1) borrow from the existing IP rights and pay a licensing
fee, or (2) avoid the scope of the existing IP rights by designing or
inventing around them.55 We refer to the first strategy as “building
on” and the second strategy as “building around.”
Two caveats are immediately in order. First, not all of the be-
havior that we label as “building around” produces valuable new
knowledge. As we discuss below, designing around IP rights may
result in the replication of existing research and creativity, often by
finding another route to provide the same product feature.56 In addi-
tion, new uses of public domain sources count as “building around”
51. See infra Parts II-V.
52. We use the term “actor” instead of firm, because at the stage of innovation that con-
cerns us most, parties may or may not have organized themselves into firms. Our analysis
includes innovative activity that takes place within a firm and also individual creativity.
53. See infra Parts II-V.
54. In this sense we are mirroring the assumption in the make-or-buy literature that the
production of a given widget is cost-justified and that the principle question is whether the
widget will be made in-house or purchased on the market. Accordingly, we ignore situations
in which the downstream innovation does not get produced because doing so is inefficient, for
example, where the expected benefits that the innovation generates are less than the costs
of producing it either through building on or building around.
55. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 34, at 578 (citing Coase, supra note 25, at 394-96).
56. See infra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
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in our schema, because they do not require licensing from the
original rights holder. Second, and conversely, the behavior that we
label “building on” is not necessarily merely duplicative and can
often result in further innovation. When downstream creators pay
to license upstream IP rights, often it is because they conceive of an
improvement or advance on the existing ideas that they wish to
produce. The result of these strategies might still be recognized as
innovative or creative if the product or service that results contains
some new content or feature that builds on the preexisting work. We
see this sort of “innovation through borrowing” all the time. A mov-
ie studio licensing the rights to a comic book character to create a
film franchise with new storylines is a prime example of this
behavior.
To begin with, we assume, as Coase did, that actors make their
decisions by considering the costs and benefits of the available
options.57 Thus, actors will choose to build around if they believe the
marginal benefits of doing so exceed the marginal benefits of
building on.58 Both strategies have benefits and costs for down-
stream creators. For example, building around existing IP rights
can be risky and uncertain, because it may be difficult to anticipate
how easily one can generate a new, noninfringing idea. On the other
hand, if a creator builds around, she does not have to pay for a
license, and she may obtain her own IP rights in her new innova-
tion.59 Building on existing IP rights produces the inverse set of
costs and benefits. The borrower has to pay a license fee and absorb
any attendant transaction costs, and she might not obtain independ-
ent IP rights in her own efforts.60 She does, however, avoid the
unpredictability of innovation and the risk that she will sink money
into a barren mine.61 If the ratio of benefits to costs seems more
57. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in
Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, 25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 3
(1994) (“The inventor, or the corporate research laboratory, is presumed to pick the course of
action that maximizes (expected) profits.”).
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 50, at 120 (“[I]t would likely be in the interest of a
competitor to license the existing patented invention rather than invest in developing a new
substitute, so long as the license comes at a cost lower than that required to develop that
substitute.”).
60. See Heald, supra note 37, at 483.
61. See id.
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favorable for building on upstream rights than for building around
them, the downstream creator will build on.62 If the converse is true,
the downstream creator will build around.63
We begin our discussion of each of the factors that influence O/A
decisions by focusing on downstream creators’ behavior, but that
will provide only part of the picture. In Parts II through V, we will
discuss factors that make borrowing more or less costly, thereby
influencing downstream creators’ willingness to pay (WTP) to
license preexisting innovations. For example, if the scope of existing
IP rights expands, all else equal, it will be harder for downstream
creators to build around those rights, driving up the costs of inno-
vation and, simultaneously increasing the amount that downstream
creators would be willing to pay to license existing creativity.64 But
this policy change does not inexorably lead to more borrowing. To
understand the likely effect on the innovation process as a whole,
we must take into account the effects on upstream creators of
broadening IP rights. As we will show, however, not all of the
factors that influence O/A decisions will produce effects on upstream
and downstream creators that tend to counterbalance in this way.65
Some factors will exclusively influence upstream or downstream
creators (unless the parties have complete information about each
other’s reserve prices). In those cases, a shift in that factor will
produce a systematic alteration of O/A decisions. In Part VI, we offer
some generalizations about when we should expect to see systematic
shifts in O/A decisions and when not.
II. LEGAL FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO BUILD ON OR BUILD
AROUND
Perhaps the most obvious factors affecting O/A decisions are the
legal rights that attach to existing creativity. Copyright and patent
laws determine what is protected and for how long.66 They also
62. Cf. Merges & Nelson, supra note 57, at 3.
63. Cf. id.
64. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 332 (“The less extensive copyright protection
is, the more an author, composer, or other creator can borrow from previous works without
infringing copyright and the lower, therefore, the costs of creating a new work.”).
65. See infra Part VI.
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
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determine how different others’ efforts must be to avoid infringe-
ment, and whether others can obtain their own IP rights in their
subsequent creative work.67 This Part will review these legal rules
and their influence on O/A decisions. But patent and copyright laws
are not the only factors, and are not even the only legal factors that
influence creators’ O/A decisions. Other IP doctrines, like trademark
and trade secret laws, and several bodies of law outside of IP—in-
cluding antitrust, tax, and health law—also affect the pace and
direction of sequential innovation.68 We offer a brief example of one
of these non-IP legal influences at the end of this Part. Our goal
here is limited to sketching, rather than fully specifying, the
complex skein of legal doctrines that interact to affect sequential
innovation.
A. Patent and Copyright Law
When inventors and authors produce scientific and technical
discoveries, and literary and artistic works, they can obtain patents
and copyrights, respectively, in those discoveries and works.69 The
existence of these rights means that others cannot do certain things
with those inventions and works for a period of time.70 Patent law
prevents others from making, using, or selling protected inventions
for twenty years from the filing of the patent application.71 Copy-
right law prevents others from reproducing (in whole or any sub-
stantial part), distributing, displaying, and performing protected
works, or producing works based on protected works, for a period
that usually runs for the full life of the author plus seventy years.72
During these periods, if others want to engage in activities that
implicate these exclusive rights, they have to receive a license from
the patent or copyright owner.73 Without a license, downstream
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 302; 35 U.S.C. § 154.
68. See infra Part II.B.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 302; 35 U.S.C. § 154.
70. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 302; 35 U.S.C. § 154.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
72. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). For certain works, including, most importantly, the works of corpo-
rate (versus natural) authors, the copyright term is 95 years from its date of publication, or
120 years from its creation, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
73. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 475 (2003).
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creators generally cannot borrow from protected inventions and
works until the terms of protection end and the inventions and
works enter the public domain.74 Virtually all aspects of IP doctrine,
then, are fundamentally regulations of sequential innovation.
The very existence of IP rights requires downstream creators to
contemplate whether they should design around the inventions and
works of others. In a world without IP rights, downstream creators
could freely borrow from all who came before them.75 IP rights
require downstream creators to either invest resources in designing
around these rights or negotiate costly licenses.76 The longer and
more completely ideas are protected, the more costly it is for down-
stream creators to build on them, because doing so will require a
license during the term of protection.77
The vast majority of patented inventions and copyrighted works
are most valuable shortly after their creation.78 Although some
creations have enduring value that may last for decades or even
centuries after their development, most lose value quickly.79 This is
true both for the value of the creation itself and for the value of
74. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
75. The world of culinary creativity, where recipes are typically not protected by formal
IP rights, may resemble this situation. See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal
Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1124-25, 1147-48 (2007). Of course, the absence of IP rights
and the free opportunity to copy does not mean that people will not be creative. The extensive
research on IP’s “negative spaces” shows that people will often create new works and
inventions even when they can copy those that already exist and when others can copy them
in turn. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 46, at 1688-93, 1764 (arguing that the absence
of copyright protection for fashion designs actually appears to accelerate creation and
promulgation of new designs and developing the term “negative spaces”).
76. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 332 (“[If authors were entirely prevented from
copying] they would copy works whose copyright protection had run out, or they would
disguise their copying, engage in costly searches to avoid copying protected works, or incur
licensing and other transaction costs to obtain permission to copy such works. The effect
would be to raise the cost of creating new works—the cost of expression, broadly defined—and
thus, paradoxically, perhaps lower the number of works created.”).
77. See id. at 332 n.12.
78. See Landes & Posner, supra note 73, at 475, 499-500 (providing evidence of copyright
renewal rates to suggest that most works have little or no value within a few decades).
79. For a list of twentieth-century novels that seem to have enduring value, see Christo-
pher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen when Works Enter the Public
Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 38-43
(2013).
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downstream innovation that borrows from it.80 There would not be
much demand to license the copyrights to most early nineteenth-
century novels, nor the patents to many early modern medical
devices, even if those rights still existed. To the extent, then, that IP
rights last for a term that covers all, or virtually all, of the value of
creations as inputs to new developments,81 they require downstream
creators to determine whether they should design around those
rights or pay to license them. Waiting until the IP right expires is
not an alternative.82 In contrast, if rights expired after only two
years, for example, a downstream creator might choose to neither
design around the existing work nor pay to license it, but instead
simply wait until the term ended.
Accordingly, for forms of creativity covered by IP rights that
endure for substantially all of the economic life of the work or in-
vention at issue, it is harder—and perhaps virtually never makes
sense—for downstream authors to wait until works fall into the
public domain in order to borrow from them. The amount that
downstream creators are willing to pay to license rights or to spend
on research and development (R&D) designing around them will
increase with increasing IP duration—but only up to a point. When
IP rights are made long enough to endure for a period at least as
long as the anticipated economic life of the works and inventions
they cover, then additional increases in term will not further affect
downstream innovators’ willingness to license.
80. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 73 (discussing factors that affect the value
of copyrighted material over time).
81. Patent terms have remained relatively constant since the eighteenth century—the
first Patent Act limited terms to fourteen years. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109,
109-10 (repealed 1793). Copyright terms, however, have expanded enormously. The first
(1790) Copyright Act granted authors the possibility of two fourteen-year terms. See
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802) (entitled “An Act for the
encouragement of learning”). Since then, Congress has repeatedly lengthened copyright terms,
most recently in 1998 by adding an additional twenty years. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). While some works continue
to have value a century or more after their creation, the vast majority do not. For a discussion
of term extension and the value of copyrighted works, see Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 79,
at 6-l0.
82. Cf. Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 79, at 6-10.
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1. IP Scope
More important than the length of IP rights, however, is their
breadth or scope.83 The scope of IP rights influences the size of what
we refer to as the “innovation space.” This is the unowned space
around existing IP rights that downstream creators can use for
sequential innovation. The innovation space includes public domain
material, a category composed of both works and inventions whose
terms have expired and of certain ideas or building blocks that are
not subject to IP rights.84 It also includes the as-yet-unclaimed
aspects of contemporary or future innovation—the works that have
not yet been written and the inventions that have not yet been dis-
covered.85 Broader IP rights for upstream creators means narrower
innovation spaces for downstream ones.86
IP rights vary in scope along three principal dimensions: (1) what
can be protected; (2) what sorts of behaviors constitute illegal
appropriation that IP rights protect against; and (3) what rights
downstream creators can get, if any, in their follow-on innovations.87
We consider each of these in turn, and we evaluate the distinct
approaches of copyright and patent law. Then, we analyze how
changes in scope can influence creators’ O/A decisions.
Both copyright and patent laws limit the kinds of creative en-
deavors that can be protected. Most prominent in copyright law is
the so-called “idea/expression distinction,” which allows authors to
copyright their particular expressions of ideas but not the ideas
themselves. Copyright law also refuses protection to any procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery. Subject matter within these categories either belongs in the
patent system or is not covered by IP rights at all.88 Patent law has
83. See generally Fishman, supra note 8, at 1383 (“Constraint scope measures how many
choices within a domain a given constraint precludes.”); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna,
Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197 (2016) (discussing the scope of IP rights as fundamental
to their efficacy).
84. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 83, at 2205-06.
85. Cf. id. at 2206-07 (noting that all IP regimes will grant parties rights in a work—even
if many features are not protectable—so long as that new work has some “point of novelty”).
86. See generally id. (discussing the tension between current and downstream creators
over the scope of creator rights).
87. See id. at 2204.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work
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similar limitations. No one can secure patents on laws of nature,
physical phenomena, or abstract ideas.89
These limitations ensure that some innovation space will always
be left for downstream creators. With respect to both copyright and
patent scope limitations, court decisions interpreting those restric-
tions can expand or constrict the scope of the innovation space left
open for follow-on creators.90 For example, which aspects of a story’s
plot constitute ideas and which expression?91 Or to what extent does
genetic material constitute unpatentable products of nature?92
Different answers to these questions will expand or contract the
innovation space left to subsequent creators.93
The most important aspects of IP doctrines, in terms of their
influence on O/A decisions, concern the scope of protection that
owners receive. What rights do authors and inventors get, or,
considered obversely, what sorts of behaviors constitute infringe-
ment unless licensed? Copyright law began as a right to print copies
of a work.94 Over the course of the nineteenth and especially twen-
tieth centuries, however, it has expanded to include the exclusive
rights to distribute, perform, display, and make derivative versions
of the work.95 Similarly, patent law includes broad proscriptions
against making, using, or selling the protected invention.96 Patent
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.”).
89. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (ruling
on the patentability of laws of nature).
90. See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 83 (examining the various actions courts
may take to shape validity, infringement, and defenses).
91. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (determining
whether defendant’s work, which included some similar characters and themes as plaintiff’s
work, infringed plaintiff’s copyright).
92. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117
(2013) (holding that “separating [a human] gene from its surrounding genetic material is not
an act of invention”).
93. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 677, 713 (2012) (noting that the idea/expression distinction makes it easier to design
around copyrights than patents).
94. L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and “The Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 1, 3-4 (1993).
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the exclusive rights of authors).
96. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the Unit-
ed States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
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law diverges from copyright law, however, in its treatment of in-
dependent creation or invention.97 A downstream innovator will be
liable for patent infringement if she makes, uses, or sells the in-
vention, whether or not she knows about the existing invention or
the patent on it.98 In copyright law, by contrast, a second author who
creates a work that already exists, but who is unaware of that work
and does not copy it, is not an infringer.99 In this respect, the doc-
trine of independent creation means that copyright law offers down-
stream creators a larger innovation space than does patent law, all
else equal.100 While would-be inventors are prevented from making,
using, or selling any patented invention, whether they know about
it or not, downstream copyright authors are free to create works
that are similar or even identical to existing works as long as they
do not copy them.101
Although copyright and patent laws protect owners against un-
licensed uses of their creations, both of these rights allow some
forms of free borrowing by downstream creators.102 Under copyright
law, infringement liability is limited to instances in which a
defendant’s work is “substantially similar” to a preexisting copy-
righted work.103 Jury and judicial interpretations of the term
“substantial” will expand or contract the scope of the available
innovation space. For example, Robin Thicke and Pharrell Wil-
liams’s song “Blurred Lines” was found to infringe Marvin Gaye’s
song “Got to Give It Up,” even though the defendants’ song did not
patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
97. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 525-
33 (2004).
98. See id.
99. Indeed, she can obtain a copyright in her own work even though the work already
exists. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[I]f by
some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian
Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
though they might of course copy Keats’s.”).
100. See Long, supra note 97, at 529.
101. See id. at 525-33.
102. See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 703-06 (1989)
(discussing the differences between copyright’s substantial similarity doctrine and patent’s
doctrine of equivalents).
103. See id. at 703-04.
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incorporate much of Gaye’s protected expression.104 This holding
suggests that copyright’s “substantial similarity” infringement stan-
dard is triggered by quite small amounts of borrowing.105 Similarly,
the scope of patent claims may be interpreted broadly or narrowly,
and how patent claims are interpreted will directly influence the
freedom of firms to borrow elements of a patented technology.106 So
too with regard to patent’s doctrine of equivalents, the means by
which patent law imposes liability on subject matter that, while not
within the formal scope of a patent’s claims, are nonetheless close
enough.107
Copyright and patent laws both make some additional provisions
for downstream users, however. Both include doctrines that exempt
some otherwise infringing conduct from liability. In copyright law,
the most important of these provisions is the fair use doctrine,
which immunizes defendants from liability for certain infringements
that are deemed consistent with copyright’s broader purpose of
encouraging the production of new artistic and literary works.108
Most famously, when 2 Live Crew wanted to produce a parody ver-
sion of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman,” they were denied a
license to do so.109 They made the song anyway, and when sued by
Orbison’s publisher, they asserted the fair use defense.110 The
Supreme Court found in their favor, noting that a parody “can
104. See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL
7877773, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014) (listing the minor similarities between the works).
105. See id.
106. See Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and Marks, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 119, 122 (1990) (“The claims of most issued patents are so narrow that
competitors can devise many ways of achieving the same thing as the subject matter of the
claim.”).
107. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002)
(“The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents
to the claims described.”); see also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (outlining factors considered), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phono-
records or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”).
109. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1994).
110. See id. at 573.
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provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in
the process, creating a new one.”111
In subsequent case law, the Supreme Court’s solicitude of parody
has expanded into a broader tolerance of “transformative” uses.112
As the fair use rules are understood currently, when the down-
stream work is sufficiently transformative of the upstream one—by
shifting its message or its purposes, or by appealing to a different
audience—the downstream creator is free to produce it without hav-
ing to obtain permission from the copyright holder.113 The broader
the fair use privilege, then, the less downstream creators will be
willing to pay to license upstream content.
Patent law does not have broad exceptions equivalent to copy-
right’s fair use doctrine, but some limitations on patent rights do
exist. For example, patent law includes a very narrow experimental
use exception.114 In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals the opportunity to develop and
test drugs without risk of infringement liability.115 Compared to
111. Id. at 579.
112. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the
search engine’s creation of digital copies of books to be transformative); Cariou v. Prince, 714
F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding defendant’s use of plaintiff’s photograph was trans-
formative because it “manifest[ed] an entirely different aesthetic” from the original); Blanch
v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the defendant’s use of plaintiff fashion
photographer’s photograph was transformative because it served as “commentary on the
social and aesthetic consequences of mass media”); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137
F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding a parody of a photograph in a promotional movie poster
was transformative because it modified the original “in a way that may reasonably be
perceived as commenting” on the original). 
113. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely
necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart
of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright and the
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” (citations omitted)).
114. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that
courts should not “construe the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the
patent laws in the guise of ‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and
not insubstantial commercial purposes”), superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat.
1585, 1603, as recognized in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
115. Also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); see also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Hatch-Waxman Amendments grant generic manufacturers
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copyright law’s fair use doctrine, however, these exceptions are
much narrower and do less to expand the innovation space for down-
stream creators.116
The final way in which IP doctrines define the scope of the inno-
vation space is via owners’ abilities to control downstream uses of
their works and inventions. Here, patent and copyright laws differ
significantly. Once a patent owner discloses her invention to the
world, other downstream inventors are free to invent their own
improvements of it and to secure their own patent rights on those
improvements.117 The owner of the downstream improvement patent
cannot make, use, or sell the improvement without permission from
the upstream patent owner, but neither can the upstream patent
owner make, use, or sell products that incorporate the downstream
patent.118 The two inventions are subject to “blocking patents,” and
they require negotiation between their owners to produce products
combining both of them.119
In copyright law, by contrast, the owner of the upstream copy-
right automatically obtains rights to all of the actual or potential
downstream versions of her work via the derivative rights doc-
trine.120 Thus, the moment that J.K. Rowling wrote the first Harry
Potter novel, she immediately gained the exclusive right to produce
derivations thereof, including all sequels, movies, plays, Halloween
costumes, action figures, Lego sets, and even companion guides—at
standing to mount a validity challenge without incurring the cost of entry or risking enormous
damages flowing from any possible infringement.”).
116. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (advocating for fair use-like rights for reverse engineer-
ing in patent law). 
117. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 8, at 860.
118. See id.
119. See id. (“Two patents are said to block each other when one patentee has a broad
patent on an invention and another has a narrower patent on some improved feature of that
invention.”).
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza-
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id. § 101; see also
Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than
Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 794-96 (2013) (describing the expansion of the
derivative right in U.S. law).
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least those drawing a not-insubstantial amount of copyrighted
expression from the original works.121
As a number of scholars have noticed, copyright law’s derivative
works doctrine substantially fetters downstream creators.122 The
derivative right consumes a substantial portion of the available
innovation space remaining around a given work.123 This makes it
relatively harder for downstream authors to write around existing
copyrights by taking a story in a new direction or developing a new
version of a work.124 If a downstream author produces a work that
falls within the scope of the derivative right, she will receive no
protection for it at all unless she can contract with the upstream
rights holder.125 This may be difficult to do, however, given the in-
herent risks in disclosing information. Once the downstream creator
informs the upstream owner of her idea, the upstream owner is free
to appropriate it without paying the downstream creator. This is
what happened in Pickett v. Prince, where the late recording artist
both sued the defendant for making a guitar in the shape of the
plaintiff’s unpronounceable symbol and appropriated the rights to
the guitar as a derivative work.126 Had Pickett been a patent rather
121. But see Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 539 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (holding a Harry Potter companion guide that copied some text from the Harry Potter
books to be an infringing reproduction, but refusing to hold it also an infringing derivative
work because it did not “recast the material in another medium to retell the story of Harry
Potter, but instead [gave] the copyrighted material another purpose”). The refusal in RDR
Books to recognize the companion guide as a derivative work is unusual. See Pickett v. Prince,
207 F.3d 402, 405-06 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the artist Prince has the exclusive right to
produce guitars in the shape of his unpronounceable but copyrighted symbol); Anderson v.
Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989) (dismissing
the lawsuit of an author who wrote an authorized script for a new Rocky movie against
Stallone for using aspects of the script in his own sequel).
122. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1017-18; Merges & Nelson, supra note 8, at 908 (“Our
general conclusion is that multiple and competitive sources of invention are socially preferable
to a structure where there is only one or a few sources. Public policy, including patent law,
ought to encourage inventive rivalry, and not hinder it.”); see also Fishman, supra note 8, at
1394-95 (recognizing the constraints imposed by the derivative right but arguing that these
constraints may be good for downstream creators).
123. See Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doc-
trines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 318 (2005) (“Competition among authors for consumers
interested in the same subject matter thus exists only where the derivative right does not
extend.”). 
124. See Fishman, supra note 8, at 1381.
125. See id. at 1381-82.
126. 207 F.3d at 405-06.
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than a copyright dispute, the defendant could have obtained legal
rights in his follow-on innovation and compelled Prince to negotiate
with him over the production of Prince-symbol-shaped guitars.127
2. Owning and Licensing IP Rights
When downstream creators consider licensing upstream rights
they will face various expenses. First, the license will often cost the
downstream creator money, and second, the parties will have to
spend time and effort transacting over it.128 The transaction costs
attending these negotiations may be so large that they swamp the
value of creating the downstream work, making it cheaper to design
around instead.129 Imagine, for example, someone wanting to write
a screenplay and make a movie based on a 1930s novel by an author
about whom little is known and who is difficult to track down. As we
noted in Part I, these sorts of transaction costs will be one of the
principal determinants of whether building on prior works occurs.
Any features of the IP regime that influence them will likely have
significant impacts on O/A decisions.
Transaction costs tend to be lower when it is easier for parties to
determine whether and with whom they need to transact. Patent
law requires patentees to file applications and disclose their inven-
tions so downstream creators can understand which inventions exist
and may need to be licensed.130 Applications also include the names
of the original inventors, and the U.S. Patent and Trade Office
generally tracks patent assignments.131 Copyright law previously
127. Cf. Merges & Nelson, supra note 8, at 860 (explaining how the “dominant” holder of
a broader patent can block the “subservient” holder of a narrower patent).
128. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1055.
129. Id. at 1055 (“[S]ome potential improvers who would seek a license for their improve-
ments will no longer do so because of transaction costs.”).
130. See Heald, supra note 37, at 476 (“[P]atent law serves to lower transaction costs in
ways previously unidentified in the theoretical literature. By establishing a title registration
system for some sorts of information assets, patent ownership rules significantly reduce
transaction costs compared to the available alternative systems for protection: trade secrecy
and contract law.”).
131. See Nonprovisional (Utility) Patent Application Filing Guide, U.S. PATENT & TRADE-
MARK OFFICE (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/
types-patent-applications/nonprovisional-utility-patent [https://perma.cc/DZ9M-FRTW] (over-
viewing the patent application process, including the name requirement and the tracking
process).
30 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:001
required authors to register their works and provide notice of
ownership.132 Beginning in 1978, however, copyright vests in the
creator the moment a minimally creative artistic or literary work is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Authors no longer need to
comply with formalities in order to obtain rights to their works.133
While patent law’s efforts do not eliminate information costs, the
situation in copyright law is clearly worse.134 Thus, because copy-
right’s lack of formalities increases transaction costs for down-
stream creators, it likely drives more downstream creators towards
designing around existing works rather than licensing them.
Another substantial influence on the transaction costs of sequen-
tial innovation is the way IP rights are structured. Following Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s classic formulation,135 IP rights
are generally structured as property rules, whereby downstream
creators must individually locate upstream creators and negotiate
licenses in order to use their works and inventions.136 These
transaction costs can be steep and will often prevent otherwise
efficient licensing from taking place.137 In other cases, though, IP
rights are structured as liability rules, in which the price for
licenses is set by a court or administrative body and licensing does
not require individual negotiation with rights holders.138 Compul-
sory licenses in IP law can substantially reduce transaction costs
leading to greater borrowing from existing works and inventions.139
Perhaps the best example of borrowing via compulsory license is
the compulsory “mechanical” license in copyright law. Downstream
creators who wish to record their own versions (for example, covers)
of previously recorded songs may do so by paying a preestablished
132. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487-88
(2004).
133. See id. Many authors do register their copyrights, so there are some ways of determin-
ing ownership.
134. See Long, supra note 97, at 532.
135. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (setting forth a
framework to integrate the analysis of property and tort law, and proposing that all
“entitlements” are under either “property rules” or “liability rules”).
136. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1302-03 (1996).
137. See id. at 1306-07.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1295.
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rate.140 The ease with which downstream creators may borrow has
produced a wealth of recordings of existing works, including, for
example, more than twenty thousand versions of the song “White
Christmas” currently available on Spotify.141 Whether or not this
many versions of the song are socially desirable, it is strong
evidence that compulsory licenses, at least when rates are not
prohibitive, push downstream creators toward borrowing.142
B. Other Legal Doctrines that Influence Decisions to Build On or
Build Around
As we have seen, copyright and patent laws exert substantial
influence over sequential innovation. But legal scholars err if they
confine their thinking to these areas of law when they consider
methods for regulating innovation. A wide range of legal doctrines
also influence the pace and direction of sequential innovation. Other
IP fields like trademark and trade secret laws,143 as well as law
outside the domain of IP, like antitrust law,144 tort law,145 and health
and environmental regulation,146 can affect whether downstream
creators build on existing ideas or build around them and develop
their own. Recently, scholars have begun to address the linkages
140. Downstream performers may not change the basic melody or fundamental structure
of the recorded song. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (2012). Note that most mechanical licensing
takes place privately through the intermediary Harry Fox Agency rather than through the
compulsory license. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
141. Walt Hickey, The Most-Covered Christmas Songs Ever, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 14,
2015, 12:44 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-most-covered-christmas-songs-ever
[https://perma.cc/9DZN-VVCX].
142. We discuss this issue at greater length infra Part VI.C.
143. See Robert G. Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183,
222-23 (2015) (“There are two ways that trademark protection for product features can impede
downstream innovation. One way is by chilling creative modifications of existing product
designs. The other way is by restricting access to basic design elements or standard design
features in an industry.”).
144. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for
the Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1700 (2013) (discussing the relationship between IP and
antitrust law).
145. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285,
303, 305 (2008) (exploring how various aspects of tort liability may produce adverse effects
on innovation).
146. See Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies
Promote Growth?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 477, 486-88 (2005). 
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between these fields and innovation. Space restrictions prevent us
from developing each of these individually, but it will be helpful as
an illustrative example to consider one unexpected legal doctrine
that could influence O/A decisions—tax law.
Governments spend billions of dollars each year attempting to in-
fluence innovation through tax schemes.147 The federal government
has determined that it wants to encourage innovative research, and
allowing tax deductions or tax credits for investments is one tool it
uses to do so.148 Recently, legal scholars have begun to focus on the
relationship between tax law and IP.149 For example, Daniel Hemel
and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette have compared different methods of
incentivizing innovation, including patents, taxes, grants, and
prizes.150
But federal and state tax laws do not just incentivize innovation
as such; they can also affect the direction and pace of sequential
innovation by altering how creators think about innovating or bor-
rowing. For example, creators can often reduce their tax burden by
deducting or expensing money invested in innovation.151 If a firm
spends money to develop a new invention, the costs of R&D can be
deducted from the firm’s overall tax obligations.152 This is basically
a mechanism for governments to reduce the costs of engaging in
R&D.153 Importantly for our purposes, however, money spent li-
censing IP rights from other firms is not eligible for the same fa-
vorable tax treatment.154 The effect, then, is to systematically favor
147. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92
TEX. L. REV. 303, 306 (2013).
148. Id. at 322 (“Let’s say that rather than spending $1 million on a new tunnel, the
railroad spends $1 million in 2013 to research more durable tunnels and safer excavation
methods. Instead of deducting this $1 million in $20,000 increments over a half-century,
Section 174 allows the railroad to deduct the full $1 million in 2013.”).
149. See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 200-07 (2003)
(examining the distortionary effects of taxation); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 147, at 319-
26; Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 129-30 (1997).
150. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 147, at 321.
151. I.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (2012).
152. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 147, at 322 (explaining how a firm that spends $1
million on research can deduct the entire amount from its tax burden in the year that the
money is spent rather than only deducting a certain amount per year).
153. Id. at 311 (noting that government research funding via grants works similarly in this
respect).
154. For example, the tax credit for increasing research activities provides credits for cer-
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designing around existing IP rights rather than licensing them,
since—if the two activities are expected to cost the same
amount—the tax deduction will lower the burden of investing in
innovation.155 We take no stand on the desirability of using the tax
code to influence these outcomes, but we simply point out the man-
ifold legal influences on downstream creators’ O/A decisions.
Tax law is far from the only area of the law that systematically
favors one form of sequential innovation or the other. We hope that
subsequent research will focus on the ways in which other legal
regulations influence creators’ O/A decisions.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL AND ARTISTIC FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS 
TO BUILD ON OR BUILD AROUND
When downstream creators contemplate building on or building
around existing works and inventions, they must consider more
than the scope of IP laws. In addition, individuals and firms face
various technological and artistic constraints that will influence
their O/A decisions. The value of building on versus building around
may be affected by the maturity of the given creative field, the de-
gree of interdependence among important advances in the field, and
the role of tacit knowledge involved in creative activity, among other
issues. We address these here to give a sense of the complex,
multifaceted nature of O/A decisions.
When we refer to technological and artistic factors affecting
sequential innovation, we mean features of the technological or
artistic environment that innovators operate in. We are interested
in the nature of creative or innovative production and practice
within a given field, such as painting, biotechnology, software, or
engineering. This aspect of our model focuses on how the activities
associated with creating and developing new products affect O/A
tain technological or experimental investments but not for adaptation or duplication of an
existing business component. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240,
§ 301(b)(1), 126 Stat. 2313, 2326 (2013) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 41); see also Xuan-Thao
Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 799 (2008) (dis-
cussing the differential tax treatment of investing in R&D versus acquiring innovation).
155. These sorts of tax laws may also systematically affect sequential innovation, because
they tend to favor efforts by established corporations who have taxable revenue over start-ups
that may not generate significant tax liability. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 147, at 337.
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decisions, but it excludes issues associated with marketing, sales,
and consumer preferences, which we treat in the Section on market
factors.156
A. Innovation Spaces and the Maturity of the Field
Whether a creator will build on or build around upstream rights
depends on the relative profits the creator can generate by either
choice. As we noted above, the costs of building around existing
ideas depend on the size of the available “innovation space” that a
creator can dive into by innovating.157 The easier it is for down-
stream creators to generate their own works and inventions without
implicating upstream IP rights, the lower the costs of designing
around and, accordingly, the less they will be willing to pay to
license those rights. Over time, as a field develops, creators will
enter the industry. Each act of entry by a new creator or each
sequential innovation can reduce the available innovation space.158
As the available innovation space within the emerging field
shrinks,159 subsequent creators will be more inclined to build on
existing ideas. To a considerable extent, the size of the available
innovation space is related to the maturity of a field. The more
mature a field is, the harder it may be to come up with a break-
through innovation. Most likely, creators have tried out many
different ways to approach the technical or artistic possibilities that
the field presents. Therefore, the more mature a field is, the more
difficult it becomes to build around ideas and the more we should
expect to see downstream creators building on them.
For example, consider the inventions that went into developing
one of the most popular musical instruments of the last couple
centuries: the grand piano. Improving grand piano technology is
156. See infra Part IV. On this categorization, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text.
157. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
158. This assumes, of course, that the size of the innovation space itself is not affected by
the entry of new creators or new technological innovations. If, however, the entry of a new
creator does not simply fill an available spot in the innovation space, but rather reveals new
opportunities for development, entry can also enlarge the available innovation space.
159. In economic terms, the innovation supply becomes less elastic in such industry. See
Vincenzo Denicolò, Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 22 ECON. POL’Y 679, 691 (2007).
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extremely difficult these days, as most of the innovations for this
instrument were made in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.160 By contrast, the available innovation space may be
much larger for an instrument that has only recently been devel-
oped.161
The development of smartphone technology offers another exam-
ple. When Apple put its first iPhone on the market in 2007, it was
one of the first mobile phones that used direct finger input as its
main means of interaction.162 The Apple iPhone differed consider-
ably from its technological predecessors. In fact, an ingenious combi-
nation of technology, design, and marketing helped to redefine a
product category.163 Subsequent phones adopted or mimicked many
of the iPhone’s innovations. In 2008, the first phone based on the
Android operating system (called HTC Dream) was announced.164
And 2009 saw the introduction of the first Samsung Galaxy
phone.165 As the industry has matured, the functionality and even
the design of smartphones have become increasingly interchange-
able.
As the smartphone market matures, innovating in this market
may become increasingly difficult, generating more wholesale bor-
rowing of existing technologies over time. Faced with this situation,
at some point downstream creators may begin to invest their energy
not in further refining existing products, but rather in generating
new categories of works or inventions. As the smartphone example
illustrates, innovating in one technology may become less prevalent
160. See generally ALFRED DOLGE, PIANOS AND THEIR MAKERS (1911); EDWIN M. GOOD,
GIRAFFES, BLACK DRAGONS, AND OTHER PIANOS (2d ed. 2001).
161. See Stefan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Innovation
Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in Intellectual Property, 91 IND. L.J. 1251,
1265 (2016) (comparing the advances in grand piano technology with the development of the
electroencephalophone, which uses brain waves to generate sounds).
162. See Cheih-Ying Chen & Huang-Chieh Chang, Exploration of Picture E-Book Design
for App Web, in 3 UNIVERSAL ACCESS IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 291, 292 (Constan-
tine Stephanidis & Margherita Antona eds., 2013).
163. See id.
164. See Jon Turi, Gadget Rewind 2008: T-Mobile G1 (HTC Dream), ENGADGET (June 22,
2014), https://www.engadget.com/2014/06/22/gadget-rewind-2008-t-mobile-g1-htc-dream/
[https://perma.cc/4K2R-3L99].
165. See Simon Hill, A History of Samsung’s Galaxy Phones and Tablets, from the S1 to the
S4, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:11 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/android/history-
of-samsungs-galaxy-phones-and-tablets/ [https://perma.cc/2HBD-86VT].
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as the technology is replaced by related, new products like tablets
and wearable technology. Therefore, the more mature a field be-
comes, the higher the incentives for new entrants may be to explore
novel ideas outside of the boundaries of the matured field.166
As a result of these factors, the relative importance of building on
versus building around could have an inverted U-shape: the amount
of building on within a field increases up to a certain tipping point.
Once the technological or artistic development within the field has
reached a maturity tipping point, however, new creators will exit
the field by inventing or designing around the field as a whole,
thereby contributing to a decline in borrowing within the industry
and a slow substitution of the existing technology. At some point,
many industry leaders may fail because they ignore disruptive
technologies that initially targeted small customer segments but
later displace the industry leader’s product.167 This displacement
effect is driven by the increasing fraction of decisions to innovate
rather than borrow in a mature industry.
B. Dependency on Input Factors
New creations and innovations differ in the extent that they de-
pend on upstream creations and innovations to produce marketable
products. For example, the owner of a copyright in a painting can
usually generate complete, marketable products entirely from the
single painting. She does not need to worry about securing other IP
rights in order to print and distribute copies of the painting. Many
pharmaceutical patents work similarly.168 By contrast, the owner of
166. These sorts of concerns are not isolated to scientific or technological developments.
Consider, for example, the history of classical music. Following the eight modes of pitch
organization used in Gregorian chant, classical music was dominated by tonality from about
the seventeenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. As the available innovation space
within tonality became smaller and smaller, composers were not only forced to bend the
boundaries of tonality; they ultimately had to break it. It was Arnold Schönberg’s twelve-tone
technique and, later, serialism, which deliberately changed the rules of musical composition,
that made borrowing from older composition difficult and pushed composers towards inno-
vating. See generally CARL DAHLHAUS, STUDIES ON THE ORIGIN OF HARMONIC TONALITY
(Robert O. Gjerdingen trans., 1990).
167. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 25-26 (Harper Bus. 2011)
(1997) (arguing that existing players often ignore major changes to their fields because they
focus on incremental advancements rather than on “disruptive” alternatives).
168. In the context of new molecules with therapeutic effect, anything that would flow
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a patent relating to smartphone technology is not in a position to
produce smartphones simply on the basis of that patent. The owner
would have to license hundreds or possibly thousands of other
patents to produce phones that incorporated the invention.169 Thus,
downstream creativity will vary in the degree to which it is inde-
pendently or interdependently enabled.
Having to license a substantial number of other IP rights creates
enormous transaction costs for downstream creators. Normally,
increases in transaction costs will tend to discourage building on
rights relative to building around them, because transaction costs
exhaust surplus value.170 In the case of interdependent innovation,
however, the same may not be true. When downstream creators
know that they are going to have to license many other IP rights in
order to create a marketable product based on their innovations,
they may be more likely to simply build on one or more of those IP
rights anyway. Imagine that Firm A is interested in improving one
aspect of a smartphone such as its screen functionality. If the firm
knows that in order to produce phones, it will have to license fifty
patents from Firm B, most of which do not relate to screen function,
it may choose to simply improve on Firm B’s screen patents rather
than design around them. Although downstream creators may be
able to invent around one or a few of the rights necessary to making
a marketable product, the effort required to invent around all of
them may be impossible.171 Simply licensing all of the necessary
rights reduces risk and R&D costs, and it probably does not result
in significantly higher transaction costs.
In a similar fashion, the availability of upstream inputs will influ-
ence downstream creativity and innovation to the extent that there
are many or few available substitutes in the upstream market. Up
to now, we have used examples in which a downstream creator de-
cides whether to build on an innovation from one upstream creator
downstream from the patentable subject matter is covered by the patent. 
169. For instance, the inventor would have to license the patent for the touch screen tech-
nology, the operating system, and Wi-Fi connectivity. 
170. See supra Part II.A.2.
171. Downstream creators may still choose to design around some rights, however, if
licensing those rights is particularly expensive or if they are owned by a particularly tough
competitor. Recall that our O/A decision is framed at the level of individual IP rights rather
than at the level of products as a whole. See supra Part I.C.
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or to build around it. Now imagine that, in the upstream market,
two or more firms each have a patent on their own inventions, and
that these inventions are (at least) partial substitutes as inputs for
the downstream creator. For example, if a car manufacturer contem-
plates expanding its hybrid car line, it may think about whether to
pay patent licenses for existing battery technologies or whether to
invest in developing its own battery technology. How the car
manufacturer makes this decision will depend, among other things,
on how many firms offer competing battery technologies in the
upstream market. If several suppliers in the upstream market offer
advanced battery technologies that are partial substitutes, the
upstream market may be highly competitive, which reduces firm
revenues in this market even though each of these firms may own
a patent on its technology. In such an upstream market, a down-
stream firm may find inventing around existing technologies very
unattractive, as the revenues the downstream firm could make from
its own patented technology may be small and could not pay back
the R&D costs needed to develop the technology. Rather, the down-
stream firm may decide to license an existing battery technology. If,
by contrast, only one upstream supplier offers an advanced battery
technology, and the downstream firm thinks that there is sufficient
room for additional innovation, the downstream firm may be more
inclined to develop its own battery technology and not license.
Therefore, the number of competitors and the size of the available
innovation space on the upstream market will influence the
downstream firm’s O/A decision.172
C. Tacit Knowledge
One of the main justifications for IP law is that informational
goods are expensive to produce but cheap to copy.173 While this may
be true for many creations—for example, movies are costly to write
and produce but very cheap to copy in the digital era—it is not true
for others.174 Many works and inventions are hard to replicate
172. See supra Part I (describing the available innovation space).
173. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 6 (3d ed.
2010).
174. See Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implica-
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because the knowledge needed to recreate them may be hard to
codify or express.175 Scholars refer to these creations as involving a
high degree of “tacit knowledge.”176 Tacit knowledge cannot be read-
ily described or articulated, because the people who have it are
unable to explain all the steps which are necessary to recreate the
creation; because no technology or standard for such codification
exists; or because such codification would be prohibitively costly.177
Higher degrees of tacit knowledge increase the difficulty of
contracting over information exchange. When tacit knowledge is
high, the downstream party does not simply need to obtain the
information about the creation or invention itself, but also informa-
tion about how to produce it. According to Keith Pavitt, “Even
borrowers of technology must have their own skills, and make their
own expenditures on development and production engineering; they
cannot treat technology developed elsewhere as a free, or even a
very cheap, good.”178 For example, just because a firm owns the
rights to produce a movie version of a successful comic character
does not mean that it has the knowledge and ability to capture the
features of the character that made him so successful in the first
place. The same is true for technological know-how that might not
be fully disclosed in the contents of a patent.
Because tacit knowledge is hard to articulate, it can be hard to
prove whether a contracting party has delivered it.179 This leads to
moral hazard problems: upstream creators may not have sufficient
incentives to reveal all their tacit knowledge, and downstream
creators may be unable to tell whether they have received all of it
until they have sunk substantial resources into the project.180 In
tions for Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 429, 429 (1994).
175. See id. at 429-30.
176. Id. at 430 (distinguishing between information that is explicitly encoded and informa-
tion that is tacitly encoded).
177. Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1009, 1014-16 (2008).
178. Keith Pavitt, The Objectives of Technology Policy, 14 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 182, 186 (1987).
179. In contract theory terms, delivery of tacit knowledge may be observable, but it is often
not verifiable. Some information about Party A may be observable by Party B, but it may not
be verifiable by courts or other institutions. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT,
CONTRACT THEORY 24 (2005). 
180. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548-50 (2009) (explain-
ing how mandatory disclosure in the patent system stimulates productivity by contributing
to the public knowledge and helping competitors understand the metes and bounds of the
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such an environment, a firm may decide to innovate by itself rather
than borrow from another firm. Imagine that an upstream patent
holder uses its patents to manufacture a vaccine. The downstream
firm would like to improve the vaccine patent and produce its own
vaccines. When the downstream firm considers licensing the patent
from the upstream firm, it will have to consider whether the
upstream firm will reveal all of the tacit knowledge that is not
disclosed in the patent. If the downstream firm realizes that the
upstream firm did not convey all of its tacit knowledge after it has
already sunk costs into the improvement—for example, because
they are unable to manufacture the vaccines to the same quality
standards—it may be too late. Similar sorts of problems may arise
with contracts over ideas for creative works.181 The difficulties of
writing contracts about idea development could lead more creators
to innovate movie and TV show scripts rather than borrow from
existing scripts.182
Tacit knowledge, by itself, does not necessarily affect creators’
O/A decisions. Whether a downstream creator builds on an existing
work or innovates her own solution, she will always need some
degree of artistic or technical expertise. But to the extent that
borrowing via licensing entails additional creation-specific costs, it
makes building on rights less attractive. Thus, if the tacit knowl-
edge is unique or relatively specialized to the particular creations
being built upon, downstream creators will have to expend greater
resources in mastering that knowledge. This increased cost will tend
to drive down their willingness to pay to license and, thus, increase
their propensity to design their own solutions.
invention so they are better able to design around it).
181. See Samuel M. Bayard, Note, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit Judges, and Movie Scripts,
Oh My!: Copyright Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 605
(2001) (discussing the tension between the copyright law principle of refusing protection to
ideas, and the “express contract theory of idea protection, [in which] an idea-person has an
enforceable contract and may sue for damages if the idea-recipient expressly promises to pay
for an idea if it is used”).
182. On the role of copying in the TV show format industry, see Stefan Bechtold, The
Fashion of TV Show Formats, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 451, 459-61. On the contractual tools
Hollywood uses, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets,
64 DUKE L.J. 605, 617-30 (2015).
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IV. MARKET FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO BUILD ON OR
BUILD AROUND
When contemplating whether to build on or build around existing
rights, creators will not simply focus on IP rights or technological
capabilities. Individuals and firms making O/A decisions also face
a host of market factors likely to bear on their choice. In our categor-
ization, market factors influence the O/A decision directly through
price. For example, consumers’ tastes and preferences will often
shape downstream creators’ behavior by affecting the demand for
the creators’ works and, thereby, the prices creators can charge.183
O/A decisions will also be affected by aspects of the competitive
market (the degree of competition in a market influences market
prices); the existence of third-party intermediaries (decreasing costs
of operation and, as a result, market prices); and the extent to which
borrowing produces agency costs. We will describe these briefly
here. Each is a subject on which we need significant research.
A. Consumer Tastes for Similarity Versus Novelty
From the economic perspective that we adopt here, creativity and
innovation have value primarily to the extent that consumers are
interested in purchasing products that contain works and inven-
tions.184 And in general, from the perspective of an economically
motivated actor, whether a given act of innovation is worth under-
taking is determined by assessing whether consumers are willing to
183. Of course, factors from other categories can also influence market prices: whether an
innovation depends on an input factor or whether the industry in which the innovation occurs
is mature can have an impact on prices. Also, legal rules can influence market prices. In fact,
over thirty years ago, Lawrence Friedman noted that economic theory views the law as a
“giant pricing machine.” Lawrence M. Friedman, Two Faces of Law, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 13, 13.
Despite the admirable omnivorousness with which economic models ingest everything and
process it into an economic question, we still think that a substantial difference exists in
whether an O/A decision is influenced by price, or by another factor that may indirectly influ-
ence price, but more immediately impacts the innovator’s non-cost-related O/A considerations.
We have structured our categorizations accordingly. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text.
184. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441,
1444-45 (2010).
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pay for it. But consumer tastes for novelty are not uniform, and they
may differ systematically between media, genres, and technological
fields.185 These differences in consumer tastes, then, will influence
creators’ O/A decisions, because the differences tend to make certain
kinds of creativity—either building on or building around—more
valuable.
At a general level, people may have varying tastes for novelty
between the fields typically governed by copyright law and patent
law, respectively. As Jeanne Fromer has emphasized, many consum-
ers of copyrighted creativity object to excessive novelty.186 History
abounds with examples of artists whose advancements of previous
works were considered extreme and intolerable to contemporary
audiences. According to many accounts, members of the audience for
Igor Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring rioted upon experiencing the
ballet and orchestral work for the first time.187 Yet while many peo-
ple find novel art excessively challenging and disorienting, people
are rarely upset by a new pharmaceutical that vastly outperforms
existing options.188 Consumers typically object to excessive newness
in scientific or technological achievements only when they are re-
quired to make substantial efforts to learn how to use new technolo-
gies.189
Consumers’ aggregate tastes for novelty also tend to vary among
creative genres and media. Although it might seem like consumers
will value novelty, in some cases they indicate preferences for a high
degree of similarity. For example, consumers seem quite receptive
to “tweaking”190 in music. We see this in popular music, where many
musicians cover songs written by others, performing and rerecording
185. See id. at 1471-74, 1479-83 (contrasting the degrees of newness consumers will accept
in scientific fields versus artistic fields).
186. See id. at 1479-80 (describing the futile efforts of Harry Partch who created “a forty-
three-tone scale, developed his own form of musical notation for the scale, created musical
compositions for this scale, and invented new instruments that could play all forty-three
tones”).
187. See MODRIS EKSTEINS, RITES OF SPRING: THE GREAT WAR AND THE BIRTH OF THE
MODERN AGE 21-39 (1989).
188. See Fromer, supra note 184, at 1472 (“More importantly, our culture is typically happy
to accept technological inventions that flout accepted conventions and make great leaps in
newness.”).
189. See id. at 1473 (“When an invention does not require its users to learn anything new
or change their usage patterns, they are inclined to adopt the invention more readily.”).
190. See infra note 296 (defining “tweaking”).
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preexisting material with variations.191 Few people object to Joe
Cocker’s renditions of classic rock & roll songs or Jimi Hendrix’s
version of Bob Dylan’s “All Along the Watchtower” because the
performers did not write new compositions. We see an even more
pronounced openness to borrowing in jazz. Although new jazz com-
positions are valued, many musicians rework a set of standard
pieces.192 Creativity, in this context, does not mean doing something
entirely new, but rather doing something old in a new way.193
We also see openness to similarity in “functional” sorts of cre-
ativity. For example, in software, user interfaces and application
programs look very similar, and successive versions of programs
often borrow heavily from previous versions and improve them
incrementally.194 Consumers primarily value utility rather than
newness when they purchase software.195 From the consumer
perspective there is a cost to newness. Radical changes in software
often require the consumer to invest in learning to use the new
offering.196 The strongest versions of this preference involve the
existence of network effects associated with upstream technolo-
gies.197 If many consumers have adopted and become used to a
191. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting the thousands of cover versions of
popular Christmas tunes available on Spotify).
192. Jazz standards are musical pieces “that a professional [jazz] musician may be expected
to know.” THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF JAZZ 1155 (Barry Kernfeld ed., 1994). Jazz musi-
cians often add predetermined alterations to an underlying jazz standard, “creating an
arrangement that better comports with the idiom.” Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and
That Ain’t Good, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1943 (2005). 
193. Perhaps the starkest form of consumer preference for borrowing is the development
of canonical French cuisine in the nineteenth century. Chefs were not expected to develop
their own unique recipes, but instead to master the preparation of dishes documented in
standard sources like the cookbooks of Antoine Carême and Auguste Escoffier. See
Buccafusco, supra note 75, at 1148 (“While literary authors had solidified a norm (if not a
practice) of individual creative composition by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, cuisine seems to have held on to a process of ‘serial collaboration’ based on minor
modifications to canonical recipes.” (footnotes omitted)).
194. See Fromer, supra note 184, at 1505-06 (describing how programmers who write
computer source code are more concerned with problem solving than problem finding, and as
such, are less concerned with a large degree of newness).
195. See id. at 1472 (“Once society becomes convinced of an invention’s utility and so long
as it can integrate the invention into the fabric of its members’ lives, it will tend to embrace
the invention, even if the invention is very new.”).
196. See id. at 1473.
197. On network effects in general, see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competi-
tion and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994). On the implications of network effects
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certain technology, switching them to a new technology may be
difficult. For example, once consumers got used to the QWERTY
keyboard, offering a product with a different layout became a diffi-
cult proposition for downstream creators.198 The same is true for
creativity that interacts with digital media platforms like Face-
book.199 When network effects could impede the adoption of new
technologies, downstream firms may lean towards building on prior
creations in such markets.
In other creative fields, we see very little consumer tolerance of
similarity. For example, in the world of stand-up comedy, both co-
medians and audiences value newness.200 Comedians share a norm
that prohibits appropriation of others’ jokes, even with attribu-
tion.201 More broadly, comedians seldom engage in the reworking of
existing jokes. Although several comedians may hit upon comedic
themes at about the same time (often driven by events in the news),
they typically disclaim intent to copy. Those identified as intentional
copyists are derided and even subjected to informal sanctions from
their fellow comedians.202
Traditionally, the visual arts have provided an excellent example
of the limited market for similarity between works. It is incredibly
rare to find a downstream visual artist who paid to license the work
of an upstream artist in order to make her own version of it.203 In
the visual arts, creators are expected to produce novel paintings
that express their own ideas in unique ways. This is not to suggest
that artists do not borrow from one another regularly. They do so all
of the time, as many examples in art history attest.204 These forms
for the legal system, see generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1998).
198. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 197, at 594 n.481.
199. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 10-11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991261
[https://perma.cc/BVD4-PUEB].
200. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94
VA. L. REV. 1787, 1789-90 (2008).
201. See id. at 1812.
202. See id. at 1809-12 (exploring copyright protection for stand-up comedy and noting that
social norms provide a substitute for IP law).
203. See William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
204. Consider the relationship between Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque’s versions of
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of borrowing are not what we mean by “building on.” In these cases,
downstream creators do not license upstream IP rights. Instead,
they make use of the idea/expression distinction or the fair use
doctrine to evade those rights.205 Accordingly, in our model, their
behavior constitutes a form of building around. Indeed, it is the very
strength of the assumption of originality among artists and consum-
ers alike that makes appropriation art—the wholesale copying of
another’s work—so interesting.206 Sherry Levine’s re-photographing
of Walker Evans’s photographs is meant, in part, to challenge the
extent to which people expect originality in visual art.207
In other art forms, we see consumer preference for novelty from
time to time. When Hungarian composer György Ligeti wrote the
orchestra piece “Atmosphères” in 1961, he produced a radically new
compositional style involving micropolyphonic textures.208 This com-
position not only made Ligeti famous,209 but it also met consumer
preferences for novel acoustic expressions of that time. This is exem-
plified by the fact that Stanley Kubrick used the piece in his science
fiction movie 2001: A Space Odyssey.210
These examples illustrate that consumer acceptance of similarity
varies widely among different creative fields. To the extent that con-
sumers have consistent preferences for either novelty or similarity,
downstream creators will feel constrained to shape their behavior
accordingly. Creators considering whether to borrow or innovate
must keep consumer acceptance in mind when making that
decision. Thus, creators in fields in which borrowing is well accepted
have greater latitude, all else equal, to tweak existing creativity. In
other cases, however, where consumers prefer or even demand
novelty, downstream creators will feel less constrained to pay for
analytic cubism or Picasso’s reworking of a painting by Edouard Manet.
205. See Landes, supra note 203, at 8-11.
206. See generally Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1155 (2013); Landes, supra note 203. 
207. See Hick, supra note 206, at 1178.
208. See DAVID COPE, TECHNIQUES OF THE CONTEMPORARY COMPOSER 101-06 (1997).
209. See PAUL GRIFFITHS, MODERN MUSIC AND AFTER 266 (3d ed. 2010); Interview by Istvan
Szigeti with György Ligeti (July 29, 1983), http://ronsen.org/monkminkpinkpunk/9/gl4.html
[https://perma.cc/YS7Y-UFC2].
210. See Alex Ross, Space Is the Place, NEW YORKER (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2013/09/23/space-is-the-place [https://perma.cc/4V6N-TLCX].
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upstream rights. Designing around those rights will be a key feature
of creativity in such fields.
B. Market Intermediaries
If downstream creators want to build on an existing idea or so-
lution, they will have to engage in licensing agreements with
upstream creators. As we have noted previously, whether such li-
censing agreements are feasible will depend on the transaction costs
of negotiating, concluding, and enforcing such agreements.211 The
existence of substantial transaction costs can erode the surplus
value generated by the downstream creation, making it more cost
effective to build around existing rights. To the extent, then, that
mechanisms exist to reduce transaction costs, downstream creators
will tend to engage in more borrowing, all else equal. Third-party
market intermediaries can play an important role in facilitating
such agreements.
In the realm of copyright law, the Harry Fox Agency offers a
third-party mechanism for licensing cover versions of songs that
supplements the existing legal regulation of compulsory licenses.212
In some technological fields, patent pools attempt to enable access
to large bundles of patents.213 In patent pools, companies agree to
cross-license patents relating to a particular technology.214 They
facilitate licensing by offering access to dozens, hundreds, or even
thousands of patent licenses at the same time.215 Patent pools can
thereby reduce transaction costs and make borrowing attractive to
downstream firms.216 Relatedly, technology transfer offices at uni-
versities assist firms in identifying relevant inventions at a
211. See supra Part II.A.2.
212. See Merges, supra note 136, at 1378 (discussing the Harry Fox Agency and compulsory
licenses under 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994)). 
213. See Rudy Santore, Michael McKee & David Bjornstad, Patent Pools as a Solution to
Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J. L. & ECON.
167, 169 (2010).
214. See Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation—Evidence
from 20 US Industries Under the New Deal, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1-2 (2016).
215. Id.
216. On various dimensions of the patent pool debate, see generally Nancy Gallini, Cooper-
ating with Competitors: Patent Pooling and Choice of a New Standard, 36 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
4 (2014); Lampe & Moser, supra note 214; and Santore, McKee & Bjornstad, supra note 213.
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university and in concluding licensing agreements for these technol-
ogies.
Such collective rights organizations can make it cheaper for
downstream creators to identify and locate upstream rights holders
and facilitate licensing deals between both parties. If a downstream
firm operates in an environment with smoothly functioning inter-
mediaries that facilitate licensing deals with upstream firms, the
downstream firm may be more inclined to enter into such a deal,
compared to an environment in which transaction costs are higher.
The more efficiently the licensing market functions, the less
attractive it becomes for a downstream firm to build around.217
V. CREATOR FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO BUILD ON OR
BUILD AROUND
The choice of whether to build on existing rights or to build
around them is ultimately a decision made by creators. Accordingly,
to understand creators’ O/A decisions, we must know something
about how creators specifically, and people more generally, make
decisions.218 O/A decisions have many features that have been exten-
sively studied by behavioral scientists. Creators must weigh risks
and uncertainties, and they must determine the value of things that
they and others have created. In this Part, we analyze these and
other aspects of O/A decision-making.219
217. So-called “patent trolls” or “non-practicing entities” (NPEs) may influence markets for
IP licensing as well. Many who are concerned about NPE behavior suggest that they increase
transaction costs, because they assert patents of little or no value that must be licensed or
designed around. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Dis-
putes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 420 (2014). Others, however, suggest that NPEs can operate
as market middlemen who ease the transaction costs of licensing patents. See David S.
Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit & Gokhan Oz, The Patent Troll: Benign Middleman or Stick-Up Artist?
2-3 (Apr. 28, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
218. Merges and Nelson pay some attention to these sorts of creator factors. They write:
“Beliefs about the consequences of choosing one path or another are presumed to be influenced
as much by the past experience of an individual or organization and theories formed on the
basis of that experience, as on objective information about a particular new situation.” Merges
& Nelson, supra note 57, at 5.
219. While this category focuses on the behavior of creators, we investigate in our market
category how consumer preferences, through demand and price signals, influence O/A deci-
sions. On the categorization in general, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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Before discussing the creator-level influences on O/A decisions, we
want to note some important limitations on the research discussed
below. First, much of this literature focuses on individual decision-
making, but a large percentage of creativity emerges from groups.220
Both formal groups, like design firms, pharmaceutical companies,
and movie studios, and informal groups, like joint authors, collabo-
rators, and open source communities, confront these sorts of
decisions. It is not entirely clear how the findings of studies on
individual decision-making will translate into the context of group
decision-making.221 In some cases, groups may blunt the tendencies
of individuals to make irrational decisions.222 In other cases, though,
groups may magnify these effects.223 Further research is needed to
fully understand the differences between individual and group O/A
decision-making.
The second potential limitation of the research discussed below
is that it does not always emerge from creative settings. For ex-
ample, the literature on risk and uncertainty aversion is vast, but
not much research focuses on how creators evaluate and respond to
risk.224 One of the key features of the behavioral science research of
the last quarter century is that context matters.225 People do not
typically calculate costs and benefits in a coolly rational way;
instead, they evaluate particular choices with reference to how those
choices are framed.226 Accordingly, although people might exhibit
220. Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683,
1685-86 (2013).
221. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE
GROUPS SMARTER 2 (2015) (“Do groups usually correct individual mistakes? Our simple an-
swer is that they do not. Far too often, groups actually amplify those mistakes.”).
222. Joachim Ramm, Sigve Tjøtta & Gaute Torsvik, Incentives and Creativity in Groups 5
(CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4374, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319864 [https://
perma.cc/968X-XA8J] (arguing that working in groups facilitates creative problem solving).
223. See SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 221, at 2, 5-6.
224. For an older study, see John A. Glover & Fred Sautter, Relation of Four Components
of Creativity to Risk-Taking Preferences, 41 PSYCHOL. REP. 227, 229 (1977) (reporting that risk
seekers performed better on flexibility and originality measures but that the risk averse
performed better on elaboration measures); see also Florian Ederer & Gustavo Manso, Is Pay
for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1496, 1498, 1501, 1506-07 (2013)
(exploring the interaction between monetary incentives for creative problem-solving and risk
aversion).
225. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (explaining that
from the perspective of decision-making, what you see is all there is).
226. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
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risk aversion in one context, they might seek risk in another.227 We
need more research on the particular situations associated with
innovative decision-making.
Finally, applying general social science research to O/A decisions
may prove challenging due to differences in the relevant popula-
tions. Although in general, people tend to be risk averse in most
situations, the kinds of people who make creative choices may
systematically differ from the general public.228 Thus, we must un-
derstand the extent to which the particular populations of interest
are going to exhibit certain behavioral tendencies.
A. Risk and Uncertainty Aversion
Making decisions about creativity and innovation is notoriously
difficult. In many markets related to patent and copyright law,
profits are highly skewed: a few new products will be cash cows,
while most will be money losers.229 This complicates the decision
whether to invest in innovation. It is difficult to estimate the market
value for a work that has not yet been created.230 Investors can only
speculate about whether people will want to see a movie about a
postapocalyptic water-covered world. Even industry insiders claim
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457-58 (1981).
227. See Elke U. Weber, Ann-Renée Blais & Nancy E. Betz, A Domain-Specific Risk-Atti-
tude Scale: Measuring Risk Perceptions and Risk Behaviors, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
263, 264 (2002) (“[I]ndividuals do not appear to be consistently risk seeking or risk averse
across different domains and situations even when using the same assessment method, as
documented in both laboratory studies and managerial contexts.” (citation omitted)).
228. See Kenneth R. MacCrimmon & Donald A. Wehrung, Characteristics of Risk Taking
Executives, 36 MGMT. SCI. 422, 431-33 (1990) (reporting a survey revealing that the most risk
seeking business executives tend to be the most successful).
229. On patent-related industries, see F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE
SOCIETY 3, 7-12 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). On the movie industry, see
Arthur De Vany, The Movies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 615,
641 (Victor Ginsburgh & David Thorosby eds., 2006). On the music industry, see Ken
Hendricks & Alan Sorensen, Information and the Skewness of Music Sales, 117 J. POL. ECON.
324, 332-33 (2009). On the book industry, see Alan T. Sorensen, Bestseller Lists and Product
Variety, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 715, 724-25 (2007).
230. Heald, supra note 37, at 502 (“Patent valuation depends on fixing the value of the
future income stream generated by the patent right, as opposed to the value of the invention.
The problems in predicting the behavior of markets over time make most valuation, even after
a patented product is marketed, little more than a ‘guesstimate.’”).
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to find it close to impossible to predict a movie or TV show’s like-
lihood of success.231 Academy Award-winning screenwriter William
Goldmark captured this notion in his well-known remark: “Nobody
[in Hollywood] Knows Anything.”232 Similarly, it is difficult to
anticipate how easy it will be to invent around competitors’ IP
rights.233 How much time and effort will it take a team of scientists
to accomplish a similar goal in a new way? Fortunes are made and
lost on these sorts of decisions.
To be more precise, innovation decisions are characterized by both
risk and uncertainty.234 Risk and uncertainty both involve imperfect
information about the future, but they differ with respect to the
nature of that imperfection.235 A risky decision is one in which the
decision maker does not know the outcome of a decision, but she
does know the distribution of possible outcomes.236 For example,
tossing a fair coin is risky: we do not know whether the result will
be heads or tails, but we know the probabilities of those two out-
comes.237 An uncertain decision, by contrast, is one in which the
decision maker knows neither the outcome nor the distribution of
outcomes.238 For example, playing Russian roulette without knowing
how many bullets are in the revolver is an uncertain situation.239
In many behavioral science experiments, people exhibit substan-
tial uncertainty aversion.240 For example, people prefer gambles in
which they know the probabilites to those in which they do not, even
though there is no reason to think that the uncertain gamble is
231. See De Vany, supra note 229, at 619, 623-24.
232. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE: A PERSONAL VIEW OF HOLLY-
WOOD AND SCREENWRITING 39 (1983).
233. See Abramowicz, supra note 149, at 184 n.215.
234. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197-232 (Univ. of Chi. Press
reprt. ed. 1985) (1921).
235. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 36, at 225-26.
236. See id. at 225.
237. As Gilson, Sabel & Scott, explain, “Risk exists when future states of the world can be
estimated probabilistically.” Id.
238. See id. at 225-26.
239. See id.
240. See, e.g., Larry G. Epstein, A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion, 66 REV. ECON. STUD.
579 (1999) (proposing a new definition and methodology for studying uncertainty aversion);
see also Mark J. Machina & Marciano Siniscalchi, Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 729, 745-48 (Mark J. Machina &
W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014) (summarizing seminal experiments on ambiguity aversion).
Uncertainty aversion is also known as ambiguity aversion. Epstein, supra, at 579.
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worse than the merely probabilistic one.241 For example, imagine a
choice between drawing balls from two different opaque jars. If you
draw a blue ball you get $10. Most people would rather draw from
a jar that has fifty blue balls and fifty red balls than from a jar that
has an unknown percentage of blue and red balls.242
If creators behave the way most of the people in these experi-
ments do, then this should increase downstream creators’ willing-
ness to pay (WTP) to license from upstream creators. As we have
noted, the O/A decision is beset by uncertainty—about the scope of
legal protection, the ease of innovating, and the size of the relevant
market.243 Faced with the uncertain prospect of generating their
own idea, which might be impossible, costly, and infringe on existing
rights, creators may be unduly attracted to the “sure thing” associ-
ated with licensing.244 All else equal, uncertainty-averse creators
will tend to shy away from building around for their own solutions,
and will, instead, tend to rely on those already disclosed in the prior
art.245 Accordingly, the amount of money that they will be willing to
pay to build on existing IP will be systematically higher than ra-
tional choice theory would predict.246
Studies of people’s responses to risky decisions present somewhat
more complicated evidence than do those of uncertain decisions. The
leading account of how people make risky decisions, known as
prospect theory, suggests that people evaluate options based on how
241. See Roger Sherman, The Psychological Difference Between Ambiguity and Risk, 88 Q.J.
ECONOMICS 166, 166 (1974); see also Barbara E. Kahn & Rakesh K. Sarin, Modeling Ambigui-
ty in Decisions Under Uncertainty, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 265, 270 (1988) (finding that the de-
gree of ambiguity aversion may depend on the context of the decision).
242. See Kahn & Sarin, supra note 241.
243. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 884 (2007) (“The copyright doctrines that determine where private entitlement
ends and public privilege begins are inherently ambiguous.”).
244. Id. at 890-91 (describing the “license, don’t litigate” tendency).
245. Id.
246. It is possible that downstream creators can insure against some uncertainty via errors
and omissions insurance or similar products. In addition to uncertainty aversion, creators
may also be subject to risk aversion. How this affects behavior of creators has not been
studied empirically. Depending on whether O/A decisions are approached in a loss or a gain
frame, the behavioral impact on cumulative innovation may differ. See id. at 884 (arguing that
downstream creators will tend to be risk-averse in the face of potential infringement liability).
But see Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 366-
67 (2012) (arguing, on the contrary, that downstream users of works will treat liability as a
“loss” and be risk-seeking with respect to it).
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those options are framed and that different frames produce different
decisions.247 Rather than evaluating all risks equally, for example,
people compare the risk at issue to a baseline: Does the risk involve
me losing something that I have? Or, does the risk involve me
gaining something that I don’t have? People respond to these frames
differently.248
If people face a choice between two options with the same
probabilistic value, one of which entails a certain loss (for example,
losing $5) and the other has a chance of avoiding the loss altogether
(for example, 50 percent chance of losing $10 and 50 percent chance
of losing nothing), people tend to prefer taking the risk (the “Loss
Frame”).249 On the contrary, people given a choice between two
options, one of which entails a certain gain (for example, receiving
$5) and the other of which has a chance of not gaining anything (for
example, 50 percent chance of getting $10 and 50 percent chance of
getting nothing), people tend to be risk averse (the “Gain Frame”).250
They prefer the certainty of the $5 to the risk of getting nothing at
all.251
Because the framing of an option affects people’s risk preferences,
in order to understand how risk affects creators’ O/A decisions, we
need to understand how these decisions will likely be framed.
Unfortunately, this question has not yet been studied empirically,
but the problem presents two possibilities.252 One is that the O/A
decision will be approached in the Loss Frame.253 Creators may
247. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 286-87 (1979); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 226, at
457-58.
248. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 341, 342-44 (1984); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 247, at 268-69; Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 226, at 453-55.
249. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 247, at 268.
250. See id. at 265-67.
251. See id.
252. James Gibson argues that downstream creators will tend to be risk averse in the face
of potential infringement liability. Gibson, supra note 243, at 884. Steven Horowitz, by con-
trast, argues that downstream users of works will treat liability as a “loss” and be risk-
seeking with respect to it. Horowitz, supra note 246, at 365 (“Prospect theory suggests the
counterintuitive conclusion that potential users may enjoy greater use of copyrighted works
under an unpredictable regime of access rights than under a clearer one.”).
253. For example, the creator might think: “I could lose $1000 from my movie if I pay a
license fee, or I could lose either $1,000,000 or $0 if I don’t pay a license.” This Loss Frame
would, according to prospect theory, result in risk-seeking behavior.
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consider the payment of a licensing fee to be a certain loss, and they
may be willing to take the risk of building around the existing IP
rights to avoid paying the fee even though that might lead to larger
payments down the road. Or, creators might approach O/A decisions
in the Gain Frame, resulting in risk aversion and a higher willing-
ness to pay to license existing rights.254 Given the existence of exces-
sive optimism among creators discussed below,255 we tend to think
that the latter is more likely correct, but future research should be
able to provide the answer.
Importantly, however downstream creators respond to uncer-
tainty and risk, we anticipate that these factors will have effects on
O/A decisions that are more asymmetric, and therefore easier to
model, than some of the factors discussed above. This is because the
behavioral influence is likely to be felt only by downstream creators
and not by upstream creators.256 Of course, it is possible that
upstream creators will anticipate that downstream creators will
exhibit higher WTP for licenses and, accordingly, increase the price
of those licenses.257 The effect is likely to be less explicit here than
it will be for variations in the strength of IP rules or changes in
market conditions. Accordingly, we can be more confident that an
alteration in downstream creators’ tolerance for risk or uncertainty
will in fact systematically influence their O/A decisions.
B. Valuing Past and Future Creativity
One of the key features of any O/A decision involves estimating
the value of creativity. When considering whether to license existing
IP rights, a downstream creator must determine the value of those
rights, and she must compare her estimate to the price that the
rights holder charges.258 In addition, the downstream creator must
254. Thus, the creator might think: “I could make $1,000,000 from my movie for sure if I
pay a license fee or I could make either $2,000,000 or $0 from my movie if I don’t pay for a
license.”
255. See infra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
257. See Gibson, supra note 243, at 900-03.
258. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 141 (2004) (“Probably the
most important obstacle [to licensing] is asymmetric information as to the value of the
innovations. The second innovator has an incentive to overstate his costs to the first patent
holder, in order to convince the patent holder that, absent an ex ante license, he would not
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estimate the probable value of her own creative efforts.259 She must
attempt to gauge how easy it will be to invent around the existing
rights and how much value her creative efforts will return.260 Both
upstream creators and downstream creators must determine how
large they think the total innovation space is (that is, the total
market for innovations of this type) and how much of that space
upstream creators’ rights currently occupies.261 Recent research on
creativity, including a series of our own articles, suggests that sys-
tematic biases and anomalies will often beset these judgments.262
Consider first the behavior of the upstream creators who own the
rights to the existing patented inventions or copyrighted works.
Having created these new innovations, creators must then deter-
mine how much they are worth.263 An enormous body of research
suggests that owners of objects tend to systematically overvalue
them relative to potential purchasers.264 For all sorts of goods, the
least amount of money that owners are willing to accept to sell their
goods is typically substantially more than the most that they would
have been willing to pay to purchase them in the first place.265 This
gap between willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay
invest. Of course the first patent holder will not necessarily believe this representation.”
(footnote omitted)).
259. See Heald, supra note 37, at 502 & n.143.
260. See id. at 502-03.
261. See id. at 502.
262. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2010); Merges & Nelson, supra note 57, at 5 (“Beliefs
about the consequences of choosing one path or another are presumed to be influenced as
much by the past experience of an individual or organization and theories formed on the basis
of that experience, as on objective information about a particular new situation.”). 
263. See James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40
RAND J. ECONOMICS 611, 613 (2009) (“[I]f a patent holder is not as well-informed about a
rival’s potential future profits as the rival is himself, she may have difficulty setting a
mutually profitable license fee, and so ... licensing may fail.”).
264. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991)
[hereinafter Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Anomalies]; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch
& Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98
J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1339 (1990) [hereinafter Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Experimental
Tests]. For applications of this literature to the legal sphere, see Samuel Issacharoff, Can
There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1734-37 (1998); and
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1256-93
(2003).
265. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Anomalies, supra note 264, at 194.
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(WTP) has been called the endowment effect, and it can produce
substantial market inefficiencies.266 Contrary to the predictions of
the Coase Theorem, which suggests that goods should flow smoothly
and efficiently to their highest valuing users in a low transaction
costs environment,267 the endowment effect results in sticky initial
distributions of goods and inefficient markets.268
In a recent experiment, Buccafusco and Sprigman provided evi-
dence of an enhanced endowment effect when the goods to be sold
were not simply owned by one party but created by that party.269 In
this experiment, painters who were given an opportunity to sell
their paintings’ chances of winning a quality-based cash prize
demanded substantially more money than did others who were
given the same opportunity for paintings created by someone else.270
This substantial valuation gap—which we termed the creativity
effect—seemed to be primarily driven by creators’ systematically
higher estimates of the quality and, thus, likelihood of success of
their works.271 When viewing the other paintings in the competition,
creators thought that their own works were substantially better
than the others and thus, much more likely to win the prize.272 To
the extent that this effect prevails in innovation markets, it could
have profound effects on O/A decisions. Upstream creators will tend
to systematically overvalue their own works when establishing
licensing rates for them.273 They will tend to believe that their own
inventions and works are more creative than they actually are and,
thus, that they cover a larger share of the innovation space than
they actually do.274 Overvaluation by creator-licensors will tend to
266. Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate
Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2002).
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 31, 36-40 (2011).
270. See id. at 37-39.
271. See id. at 39-43.
272. For another study finding a similar result, see Michael I. Norton, Daniel Mochon &
Dan Ariely, The IKEA Effect: When Labor Leads to Love, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 453, 453-
58 (2012) (finding that subjects who assembled boxes, folded origami, and built Legos attached
substantial value to their creations).
273. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 269, at 39-43.
274. See id.
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lower the likelihood of licensing and lead, in turn, to inefficiently
high levels of building around by downstream creators.
Of course, the degree to which people and firms will be subject to
creativity effects will vary. Decision-making that is undertaken
within principal-agent relationships or institutions may reduce the
magnitude of the effect.275 In addition, to the extent that the works
being exchanged involve repeated transactions of similar kinds of
goods, the market may correct biases over time.276 For example,
inventors who repeatedly produce similar inventions may become
less subject to optimistic assessments of the quality of new ones.277
We should note, however, that creative goods are rarely, if ever,
fungible with previous goods.278 Creators may tend to think that,
although the market did not highly value their prior efforts, their
latest ones are just that much better.
Upstream creators are not the only ones who have to estimate the
size of the innovation space. Downstream creators, too, must
attempt to value the upstream creators’ efforts. To a large degree,
the value of the existing IP is determined by how easy it is to build
around.279 When making this determination, downstream creators
will be influenced, we predict, by the same sort of optimism bias
that affects upstream creators. Some evidence from one of our
experiments illustrates this point. In a set of experiments that we
ran about O/A decisions, subjects were given the choice to borrow
from an existing solution to a creativity problem or to create their
own solution and receive a bonus payment.280 Throughout these
experiments, a large cohort of subjects chose to innovate even when
275. See Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal
Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Institutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 146 (2015) (arguing
that endowment effects can be overcome by trading through institutions, such as by using
voting or trading within agency relationships); Arlen, Spitzer & Talley, supra note 266, at 18-
22 (finding diminished endowment effects in principal-agent relationship).
276. See John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J.
ECONOMICS 41, 41-43 (2003).
277. Cf. id. (discussing the negligible endowment effect on market participants with intense
trading experience).
278. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 262, at 11.
279. See Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 332 (“The less extensive copyright protection
is, the more an author, composer, or other creator can borrow from previous works without
infringing copyright and the lower, therefore, the costs of creating a new work.”). 
280. See Bechtold, Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 161, at 1267-71, 1278-79, 1284-85,
1288.
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it made no financial sense.281 In one version, 85.7 percent of subjects
chose to innovate even though it was impossible to find a better
solution than the existing one.282 Much of this behavior was driven
by subjects’ optimistic beliefs about how easily they could create
around the given solution.283
To the extent that creators or firms on either side of the O/A deci-
sion suffer from these sorts of valuation biases, we should expect to
see more building around and less building on.284 This will tend to
be the case when little market correction exists and when creators
make one-off transactions.285 Valuation biases may also arise in
situations in which the creators feel stronger emotional attachment
to their works.286 For example, the author of a screenplay may feel
particularly reluctant to give up creative control to a different
director if she is deeply attached to her work. This is not to suggest
that valuation biases are necessarily more likely in copyright-relat-
ed transactions, though. The macho culture of computer program-
ming or engineering may generate a degree of optimism bias that
dwarfs that of coffee shop poets or classical music composers.
C. Tastes for Pioneering and Tweaking
In his foundational article on the boundaries of the firm, Coase
sought to explain why some products were made within a firm and
some were developed through market transactions. One suggestion
he considered, and then quickly discarded, was that some workers
might have a “taste” for working within firms or on their own.287
281. See id. at 1275-76, 1281, 1285-90.
282. See id. at 1289.
283. Id. at 1289-1291. Some of the behavior may also have been determined by creators’
preferences to innovate rather than to borrow. We discuss this possibility in the next Part.
284. See Arlen, Spitzer & Talley, supra note 266, at 3 (explaining upstream creators’
endowment effect); Bechtold, Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 161, at 1267-71, 1278-79,
1284-85, 1288 (suggesting downstream creators’ tendency to overvalue their ability to
innovate will lead to more innovating).
285. See List, supra note 276, at 41-43.
286. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 269, at 41; see also Carey K. Morewedge et
al., Bad Riddance or Good Rubbish? Ownership and Not Loss Aversion Causes the Endowment
Effect, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 947, 948 (2009) (“People may demand a lot for their
[goods] because they actually like them, and they may like them simply because they are
theirs.”).
287. Coase, supra note 25, at 390. He explains: “The price mechanism ... might be supersed-
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Some people might like to work in groups, while others might prefer
to work alone.288 Whether or not he was right to discard the sugges-
tion in the context of vertical integration, we wish to reclaim Coase’s
discarded suggestion, which we consider to be relevant for under-
standing O/A decisions.289
To a Coaseian, whether one should build on existing IP or build
around it is purely a question of relative costs and benefits: Which
option is more cost effective?290 In some circumstances, though, a
key factor in this decision is whether one tends to enjoy novelty
more than similarity, or vice versa.291 Some people may enjoy the
thrill of coming up with a new solution to a problem even though
existing solutions exist and are perfectly serviceable.292 In other
work, we have referred to these people as “pioneers.”293 They may
value “big” ideas, or they may feel pleasure from coming up with
their own approaches.294 By contrast, other people may feel more
comfortable working on relatively minor adjustments to existing
ideas.295 We call these people “tweakers.”296 They may get pleasure
from refining others’ ideas or wringing the last bit of inefficiency out
of a previous solution.297
Although pioneers tend to get more attention and praise, tweak-
ers are often just as important for creative development.298 Beetho-
ed if the relationship which replaced it was desired for its own sake. This would be the case,
for example, if some people preferred to work under the direction of some other person.” Id.
288. See id.
289. Arora and Merges note the “preference of many engineers and scientists to work in
smaller and more intimate organizations.” Arora & Merges, supra note 34, at 452 (quoting
CHRIS FREEMAN & LUC SOETE, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 239 (3d ed. 1997)).
290. See Coase, supra note 25, at 390-91.
291. See Bechtold, Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 161, at 1276.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See Ralf R. Meisenzahl & Joel Mokyr, The Rate and Direction of Invention in the
British Industrial Revolution: Incentives and Institutions, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 443, 446 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012) (defining
tweaking as “the myriad of small and medium cumulative microinventions that improved and
debugged existing inventions”).
297. See Bechtold, Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 161, at 1276.
298. See Meisenzahl & Mokyr, supra note 296, at 447 (“The economic success of inventors
depended, among other things, on their ability to find tweakers to get the bugs out of the
invention, and implementers to construct, install, and operate it.”).
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ven’s pioneering advances beyond the classical period are justly
praised, but so is Bach’s refinement of the principles and practice of
baroque music.299 And Ralf Meisenzahl and Joel Mokyr have argued
that Britain’s success during the industrial revolution owed at least
as much to the tweaker engineers and mechanics as it did to para-
digmatic heroic inventors.300
Some people may exhibit consistent preferences for pioneering,
while others may generally prefer tweaking. In a recent study, we
showed that subjects who tended to innovate new solutions rather
than borrow from existing solutions tended to score higher in the
personality factor associated with openness to experience.301 It is
also possible, however, that people may be pioneers with respect to
one kind of creativity and tweakers with respect to another. Jimi
Hendrix was a pioneering guitarist, but he was often at his best
when he was covering others’ songs.302 The same may be true for fan
fiction authors, who like to work from an existing set of characters
to develop their own stories and themes.303
To the extent that people have stable preferences for pioneering
or tweaking, then, we should expect to see deviations from a purely
economic prediction of their O/A decisions. All else equal, pioneers
will tend to engage in more building around, while tweakers will
tend to engage in more building on. The distribution of pioneers and
tweakers in the population, or in a given field, will affect the prices
299. See Margaret A. Boden, Précis of The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms, 17
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 519, 522 (1994) (discussing tweaks and transformation in Western
classical music).
300. See Meisenzahl & Mokyr, supra note 296, at 445-46.
301. Bechtold, Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 161, at 1277-78.
302. For example, Hendrix’s cover of Bob Dylan’s “All Along the Watchtower” is often
regarded as a cover song that is better than the original. See, e.g., Michael Gallucci, 10 Cover
Songs Better than the Originals, ULTIMATE CLASSIC ROCK, http://ultimateclassicrock.com/
cover-songs-better-than-originals [https://perma.cc/7KQ5-D4TG].
303. Perhaps the most famous example of fan fiction is the fiction associated with the Star
Trek fandom. See, e.g., Francesca Coppa, A Brief History of Media Fandom, in FAN FICTION
AND FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: NEW ESSAYS 41, 45-48 (Karen Hellekson
& Kristina Busse eds., 2006) (chronicling the emergence of Star Trek fan fiction). Fan fiction
may also inspire entirely new works. For example, the successful romance novel Fifty Shades
of Grey actually began as a fan fiction spin-off of the equally successful Twilight novels. See
Natasha Bertrand, Fifty Shades of Grey Started out as Twilight Fan Fiction Before Becoming
an International Phenomenon, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2015, 1:22 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/fifty-shades-of-grey-started-out-as-twilight-fan-fiction-2015-2 [https://perma.cc/
UEP2-2NCR].
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that are paid for licenses and the kinds of creativity that are ulti-
mately produced. Any given field is likely to include both pioneers
and tweakers, although the relative proportions of each may differ.
As in the other parts, we cannot provide a single set of predictions
about how creators will make O/A decisions. The contexts of these
decisions vary along too many dimensions to enable them to be
easily generalized. Nonetheless, we can offer a variety of guidelines
for determining whether to expect more building around or more
building on, all else equal. In situations that involve uncertainty, or
that tend to attract a higher proportion of tweakers, we predict
greater than usual degrees of building on. By contrast, in situations
involving higher degrees of risk that are more subject to creativity
effects and optimism bias, or that involve a larger proportion of
pioneers, we predict greater than usual degrees of building around.
VI. REGULATING SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by establishing copyrights
and patents to incentivize authors and inventors.304 Certainly, en-
couraging creativity and innovation are laudable policy goals, and
new ideas and technologies have been major drivers of improve-
ments in social welfare. But, as we argued at the outset, building
around is not inherently more valuable than building on. Sometimes
building around is costly and wasteful. Sometimes building on is
efficient, as, for example, when it promotes desirable standardiza-
tion. The broader point is that the goal of IP policy is not to
maximize creativity and innovation, but rather to optimize creativ-
ity and innovation. And IP law is not the only regulatory tool for
accomplishing this task. In this Part, we utilize the framework
developed above to illustrate the different ways in which policymak-
ers might optimize the mix of building on and building around in
particular creative fields.
304. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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A. Optimizing Creativity Through Building On and Building
Around
The principal goal of U.S. innovation policy, including IP laws, is
promoting social welfare. Patent and copyright laws in particular
serve this goal by solving a public goods problem for information
and by assisting creators to recoup the costs of their investments in
new inventions and works.305 But this does not mean that social
welfare is best served by policies that generate more new things.306
Producing new inventions and works is costly and should be under-
taken only when the benefits they promise to generate exceed their
costs.307 These costs include the actual R&D expenditures required
to generate them, the static efficiency costs that exclusive rights
created by IP impose on consumers by limiting competition in mar-
kets for a particular innovation, and the dynamic efficiency costs
that creating IP rights imposes on downstream creators and users
who must pay more for access to existing technologies implicated
when they engage in sequential innovation.308
The same tradeoffs are at stake in creators’ choices to build on ex-
isting ideas or to build around them. Because both strategies have
costs as well as benefits, social welfare is rarely—if ever—maxi-
mized by simply maximizing one or the other. As we described
above, building on is often valuable, because it relies on existing
knowledge to reduce R&D and risk.309 And while the term “building
on” may sound static and rooted in the status quo, most examples
of building on employ prior ideas in new creative ways. Building
around, by contrast, sounds valuable and exciting, but—at least as
we have defined the term—it is not always. All we mean by building
around is designing around existing IP rights, so they do not have
to be licensed. Sometimes this leads to valuable new creations and
inventions, but other times it simply involves investing resources
305. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 20 (2003).
306. See Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of
American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 341-42 (2017). On socially wasteful patent
races, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 305, at 300-01.
307. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 305, at 20-21.
308. See id. at 16-21.
309. See supra Part V.A.
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into products that are not meaningfully different or better than
those that came before.310
There is an emerging scholarly literature on the relative benefits
of designing around existing IP rights.311 Some commentators sug-
gest that designing around is socially wasteful, because it does not
produce new value, but merely replicates existing ideas with the
added cost of new R&D.312 If the world already had one perfectly
good erectile dysfunction drug or boxing movie, did it really need a
second?313 The additional innovative effort, if all it does is simply
reinvent the wheel, is redundant and wasteful.314 It may nonethe-
less occur when the private value to the competitor in rent seeking
is greater than the social benefit generated by spending those re-
sources elsewhere.315
Sometimes, however, having multiple approaches to the same
problem can be helpful. When a group of creators applies different
techniques to solve a problem—whether technological or artis-
tic—the probability of finding an acceptable answer increases.316
This is especially true when the variety of acceptable answers to the
problem increases. For example, there might be relatively few ways
310. Building around and building on have no more inherent normative valence than do
making or buying in the standard theory of the firm literature. Both terms are descriptions
of different behaviors that can be wise or unwise, beneficial or harmful, depending on the
circumstances. And just as regulators may want to alter the amount of vertical integration
in a given field, so too may they want to alter the amount of building around or building on
in a given field.
311. See, e.g., Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECONOMICS
52 (1992) (proposing an optimal patent with a broad scope against imitations and an adjusted
patent life).
312. William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management of Intellectual
Property: An Integrated Approach, 55 CAL. MGMT. REV. 157, 171 (2013) (“‘Inventing around’
an incumbent’s technology is socially wasteful, at least if the non-infringing technology
developed by the newcomer offers no functional advantage.”).
313. Or third, fourth, fifth ...? See Bill Simmons, Sports Movies Continue to Evolve, ESPN
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=simmonsnfl2010%2Fweek16
picks [https://perma.cc/95ST-Q9JP] (“Since ‘Rocky’ captured the Academy Award for Best
Picture in 1976, Hollywood has churned out an average of one boxing movie per year.”).
314. See Abramowicz, supra note 123, at 344-45 (giving an example of how market entry
by second creator simply takes away 50 percent of profit from existing creator without any
increase in consumer welfare); Abramowicz, supra note 149, at 190 (“Inventing around
presents similar problems of excessive and functionally redundant innovative activity as
patent races.”).
315. See Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557 (2015).
316. See id. at 555-57.
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to increase the fuel efficiency of automobiles but many different
ways to paint a still life. Furthermore, designing around existing IP
rights may also beneficially increase competition and lead to techno-
logical spillovers, as new parties discover solutions to problems that
they may not have set out to solve.317
Our goal in this Article is not to resolve this question one way or
the other, either generally or in the context of any particular crea-
tive field. In fact, we argue that no single correct answer exists. In
some circumstances, social welfare will be maximized when creators
engage in a high degree of building on one another’s inventions. In
others, however, having different creators, each adopting separate
approaches to a problem, will achieve better results. We leave to
others the challenging task of determining the optimal mix for any
given field. Instead, we offer an analysis of the tools that regulators
have at their disposal if they want to alter the mix of building on
and building around. This analysis is more complicated than those
provided in the relatively simplistic, linear, and static ways in which
the incentive theory of IP is often claimed to drive innovation. But
appreciating this complexity is necessary in order to answer the
important normative issues that undergird legal regulation of inno-
vation. Policymakers and scholars must grapple with the multi-
valent factors that influence sequential innovation if they are going
to regulate it.
B. Bargaining over Sequential Innovation
When policymakers attempt to influence sequential innovation
they cannot, typically, change creators’ behaviors directly. Instead,
they attempt to manipulate behavior by altering the incentives
attached to different conduct—that is, by affecting the relative costs
of building on or building around. Incentives are neither static nor
solitary. Because creativity builds on and around existing creativity,
incentives depend on the interaction between upstream and down-
317. See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“One
of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a com-
petitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations
to the marketplace.”); Fishman, supra note 8, at 1336 (arguing that the existence of con-
straints on creativity may improve rather than hinder it).
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stream creators bargaining over innovation and borrowing. The
nature of that bargaining, in turn, depends on how creators value
different options. Here, we analyze bargaining over sequential
innovation. We will use an example of a policy that expands the
scope of upstream IP rights and shrinks the innovation space for
downstream creators, but the analysis is similar for all such
changes whether brought about by legal regulation or changes to the
other factors.
The key to understanding O/A bargaining is determining how
upstream and downstream creators will set their reservation prices
for licensing. The upstream creator’s reservation price is the least
amount of money that she would be willing to accept (WTA) to allow
the downstream creator to license her IP rights.318 The downstream
creator’s reservation price is the most amount of money that he
would be willing to pay (WTP) to license those rights.319 Ignoring the
existence of transaction costs, any time that the downstream
creator’s WTP is greater than or equal to the upstream creator’s
WTA, we should see building on take place. In such a case, it is
more efficient for the parties to agree to license the IP rights than
for the downstream creator to innovate around them. Given the
existence of some “bargaining zone”320 between the parties, they
should agree to a license fee that falls somewhere between the up-
stream creator’s WTA and the downstream creator’s WTP.321 By
contrast, when the most that the downstream creator will pay to
license is less than the least amount of money that the upstream
creator will accept, building on will not occur and the downstream
creator will build around.322
How, then, will creators’ reservation prices be established? Let us
start with the downstream creator. We will call him Desmond. This
is the easiest case. Desmond will base his WTP on the net benefits
318. Korobkin, supra note 264, at 1231.
319. Id.
320. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1791-
94 (2000) [hereinafter Korobkin, Positive Theory]; Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settle-
ment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2002) [hereinafter Korobkin, Aspirations].
321. Given the existence of some bargaining zone and thus some surplus from the
transaction, the price of the bargain will be determined by things like bargaining power, hard
bargaining, information asymmetries, and behavioral effects.
322. Cf. Korobkin, Aspirations, supra note 320, at 56-57.
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he expects from building on (but not including the price of the
license) compared to the net benefits he expects when building
around.323 Suppose that Desmond thinks that he will make $2 per
sale if he innovates (Value of Building Around) and $8 per sale if he
borrows (Value of Building On) perhaps because he will have to
spend more on R&D if he builds around. Accordingly, his WTP
would equal the difference between the Value of Building On and
the Value of Building Around. Here, he would be willing to pay $6324
or less for a license. He would be indifferent between building on
and paying a license fee of $6 and building around, so his reserva-
tion price is $6.
Now let’s look at the upstream creator. We will call her Ursula.
In a normal world of selling widgets, the seller’s WTA is based on
her costs. If it costs Ursula $20 to make a widget, she is willing to
sell it for any amount greater than that. When licensing IP,
however, the seller’s costs are harder to estimate. For some sellers
of IP, there may be little or no cost, because all they are doing is
selling a license. For example, a patent troll who does not manufac-
ture anything will only face an opportunity cost: if she gives A an
exclusive license, she cannot give B an exclusive license.
Things change when the upstream seller is actually a manufac-
turer of a product based on the IP right. Now, Ursula’s costs are go-
ing to be determined by the effects on her rents from granting a
license. If she licenses Desmond to use her IP, she may face compe-
tition from him that will lower the amount that she can charge for
her products. But she also has to be concerned that if she does not
grant a license, she may lose rents when Desmond builds around
her IP. Ideally, she wants Desmond to adopt the strategy that
lowers her rents the least. So her reservation price (WTA) is
determined by the rents she obtains if the downstream creator
builds around minus the rents she obtains if the downstream
creator builds on.
Imagine that Ursula is making $10 per unit. If she is going to
make $7 per unit if Desmond builds around her, and only $3 if he
builds on her work, Ursula wants Desmond to build around. In
323. Of course, if both of these numbers are negative, then he simply does not create at all
and does something else with his life.
324. $8x - $2x = $6x, where x is the number of units sold.
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order to do so, she will charge him a positive license fee to build on,
and her WTA is $4.325 She is indifferent between him building on
and paying $4 and him building around. If he pays any more than
$4 to build on, she is better off than if he builds around.
Now look at the comparison between these two cases: Ursula is
willing to accept any amount above $4 to grant a license, and
Desmond is willing to pay any amount less than $6 to purchase a
license. Thus, the bargaining zone covers this gap. Assuming
transaction costs are less than $2, they should reach an agreement
for a license somewhere between $4 and $6; the exact price will be
determined by bargaining power and other negotiating factors.
Importantly, note that the price for a license can be negative.
When the upstream seller stands to lose more money if the down-
stream creator builds around than if he builds on, the upstream
seller would prefer to encourage him to license. To do so, she might
actually pay the downstream creator to “license” rather than to
build around. This is basically what happens in pharmaceutical
cases in which a patent is about to expire, and the owner pays
generic entrants not to build around.326
With this basic sense of how reservation prices arise, we can
begin to consider how regulation influences bargaining over IP.
What happens to the downstream creator’s WTP and the upstream
creator’s WTA when, for example, a law increases the scope of the
upstream creator’s IP rights?
For the downstream creator, Desmond, whose WTP is Value of
Building On less the Value of Building Around, an increase in the
scope of IP will probably decrease the Value of Building Around,
since it shrinks the innovation space. Whereas, before, the Value of
Building Around was $2 per unit, now it may be only $1 per unit.
The Value of Building On will likely remain the same ($8), so now,
Desmond’s WTP will be $7 higher.327 On its own, that will increase
the likelihood of building on, because there is now a bigger bargain-
ing zone between Ursula’s WTA ($4) and Desmond’s WTP ($7).
325. $7x - $3x = $4x.
326. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regu-
latory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1557-58 (2006).
327. $8x - $1x = $7x.
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But how might the increase in IP scope affect Ursula’s WTA?
Presumably, when scope expands, the value of the remaining in-
novations decreases. Recall that Ursula’s WTA is determined by her
rents if Desmond builds around less her rents if Desmond builds on.
Accordingly, the first term (her rents if Desmond builds around) is
likely to increase because the innovating solution that Desmond
creates will tend to eat into her rents less when the scope of her
rights broadens. Fewer valuable solutions will be left for him to
attempt. Instead of making only $7 if Desmond builds around, Ursu-
la may now make $8 per unit. If Ursula makes $8 when Desmond
builds around and $3 when he builds on, her WTA would be $5.
Combining these two effects, we can see what happens to
bargaining. In this example, the magnitude of the effects on the
downstream and upstream creators is the same, so all we see is a
shift in the bargaining zone.328 Instead of the price of a license
falling between $4 and $6, it will now fall between $5 and $7. We
will not see any more bargaining or innovating than in the previous
example, but we can predict that the price of licensing will increase.
When the change in the IP regime has symmetric effects on the
value to both downstream and upstream creators, there will be no
change in building on versus building around, and only a change in
license fees.
But consider a different example instead. What if the change in
IP scope has a bigger influence on the upstream creator’s rents than
it does on the downstream creator’s benefits? For example, the in-
crease in scope means that Ursula now makes $9 instead of $7 if
Desmond builds around and still $3 if he builds on. Now Ursula’s
WTA is $6.329 If Desmond’s WTP stays at $7, then the change will
decrease the likelihood of borrowing, because the size of the bar-
gaining zone has shrunk. There is only a $1 difference between
them, so there is more likelihood that either transaction costs will
swamp the surplus or that bargaining anomalies will prevent a deal.
As the literature recognizes, the larger the bargaining zone, the
more likely there will be a deal.330
328. See Korobkin, Positive Theory, supra note 320, at 1797.
329. $9x - $3x = $6x.
330. See, e.g., Korobkin, Positive Theory, supra note 320, at 1791-94; Korobkin, Aspirations,
supra note 320, at 6.
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Thus, changes in IP scope can influence the likelihood of building
on and building around, but only if they create asymmetric effects
on the parties. If the change shrinks the bargaining zone, then li-
censing is less likely, and vice versa. And, of course, it is possible
that the change could eliminate licensing entirely if there were no
bargaining zone at all—that is, if the least the upstream creator
would accept is higher than the most the downstream creator would
pay.
C. Generalizing About Building On and Building Around
From the foregoing analysis, we can articulate a few generaliza-
tions about how different factors are likely to influence downstream
creators’ O/A decisions and sequential innovation more broadly.
First, reductions in transaction costs will almost always lead to
more building on, all else equal. For downstream creators to build
on from their upstream colleagues, they must license IP rights,
which involves finding and negotiating with those colleagues. In a
frictionless world, upstream and downstream creators would often
agree to licenses and split the surplus produced by the new
innovation; the surplus represents the bargaining zone from the
prior discussion.331 In many instances, however, transaction costs
will be greater than the surplus value, and licensing will not take
place. For example, if there is a $2 per unit bargaining zone between
the upstream creator’s WTA and the downstream creator’s WTP,
but it costs $3 per unit for the parties to negotiate a license
agreement, the license will not arise and the downstream creator
will build around. Accordingly, we will tend to see more building on
when transaction costs are lower.
The registration and publication requirements of patent law and
the compulsory mechanical licensing for music copyrights are exam-
ples of strategies for lowering transaction costs. By contrast, the
difficulty of establishing ownership of copyrighted works is a feature
of modern copyright law that raises transaction costs.332 Market or
technology factors will also influence transaction costs, including
the degree of tacit knowledge inherent in certain creative endeavors.
331. See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
332. See supra Part II.A.2.
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If tacit knowledge is high, it can be hard to transfer, increasing the
costs of borrowing.333
Second, the effects of changes in the scope of the innovation space
are often ambiguous. As our account of sequential innovation bar-
gaining explained, changes in IP scope can affect both the upstream
creator’s WTA and the downstream creator’s WTP to license. Too
often, scholars seem to assume that expanding IP rights will have
a predictable, unidirectional effect—typically to increase the de-
mand for licenses. But this need not be the case.334 As we just dem-
onstrated, a change to the scope of IP protection can have multiple
outcomes. It could create or destroy the existence of a bargaining
zone, making building on possible or impossible. It could broaden or
narrow the size of the bargaining zone, making building on respec-
tively more or less likely. Or, it could not affect the size of the bar-
gaining zone, but instead, simply shift the price of licensing up or
down. In addition, expanding IP rights might render both building
on and building around inefficient, and the downstream creator
might instead choose to work in a separate field entirely.
All of the above is true even before we consider the other,
contextual factors that influence O/A decisions. In addition to legal
policies, a shift in popular tastes or the continuing maturity of a
field can affect how valuable licensing IP rights is compared to
inventing around them. But whether these changes will ultimately
alter creators’ O/A decisions depends on whether they cause
symmetric or asymmetric changes to upstream and downstream
creators’ prices.
Accordingly, the effects of changes in the scope of the innovation
space on O/A decisions are often ambiguous. They will tend to be
driven by the magnitudes of the resulting changes in WTP and
WTA. Whether the former or latter is more likely in a particular
context depends on whether upstream or downstream creators are
more sensitive to changes in innovation space. How these poten-
tially offsetting reactions balance in practice can be assessed only
empirically, and only in context. This aspect of O/A decision-making,
like others that we have described, cannot be fully understood
through theorizing.
333. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 8.
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Finally, we predict that most of the creator factors described in
Part V will have unidirectional influences on creators’ O/A decisions,
but they will not consistently favor either building on or building
around. Unlike changes in the innovation space, where upstream
creators will be at least somewhat sensitive to the effects on down-
stream creators, we do not anticipate strategic pricing based on
behavioral biases. Upstream creators are less likely to know about
downstream creators’ overoptimism or uncertainty aversion, and
downstream creators are less likely to anticipate upstream creators’
creativity and endowment effects.335 Accordingly, to the extent that
one of these biases is operative, it will tend to have a predictable
effect on sequential innovation. Note, however, that the biases do
not all point in the same way. Some, like uncertainty aversion in
downstream creators, suggest increased building on, but others,
including upstream creativity effects, indicate greater building
around. Empirical data may ultimately provide a richer understand-
ing of when and how these factors will influence innovation and
creativity.
D. Sequential Innovation: IP Doctrine and Beyond
At least since Edmund Kitch’s classic article describing a “pros-
pect theory” account of IP law and sequential innovation,336 scholars
have been interested in how various aspects of legal doctrine in-
fluence creativity and innovation. This research has considered the
optimal length and breadth of IP rights as well as the questions
about the economic desirability of designing around those rights. In
so doing, it has focused almost exclusively on IP doctrine.337 In our
framework, IP doctrine is only one of the factors that influences
creators’ O/A decisions.338 The progress and direction of sequential
innovation will be influenced at least as much by the others factors
that we illuminate: market, technological and artistic, and creator.
Whether a given creator builds on or builds around is as much a
335. See supra Parts V.A-B.
336. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977).
337. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
338. In fact, IP doctrine is only one of the legal factors that we discuss in Part II. Other
relevant areas of law include antitrust, contract, and tax laws. See supra Part II.B.
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question of the nature of the competition she faces, the nature of the
tastes of consumers, and the nature of her own behavioral prefer-
ences and biases as it is one of copyright or patent law.
To the extent, then, that policymakers desire to regulate aspects
of sequential innovation, they must consider the full range of deci-
sion-making inputs. Policymakers typically regulate by altering
legal rules to shift the costs and benefits of desired outcomes. But
because O/A decisions are complex, regulating sequential innovation
is also complex. Changing one aspect of creators’ decisions may not
have the intended effect when other factors more strongly influence
them. Although our account of sequential innovation complicates
the regulatory picture, it also offers the possibility of using different
tools to accomplish some goals. If policymakers wish to affect
creators’ O/A decisions, our framework suggests that they should
consider manipulating any of the factors that may influence those
decisions. In some cases, shaping O/A decisions via the other factors
may be more efficient than using IP law. Indeed, our analysis pro-
vides policymakers with four guidelines that they should consider
before regulating.
First, if policymakers want to optimize innovation and creativity,
changing IP regimes may be a successful strategy if the innovation
environment is not dominated by other factors. History provides a
clear example of regulators altering the ratio of innovating to bor-
rowing by manipulating IP regimes. In the early twentieth century,
Congress was concerned about the power of the Aeolian Company
in the market for player piano performances of musical composi-
tions.339 Aeolian owned the important patents on player piano
technology, and it began to lock up licensing deals with musical
composers to produce player piano versions of their songs.340 Other
producers of player piano rolls would be forced to either find or
create their own music to record, or attempt to license compositions
from the monopolist, Aeolian. Fearful that this situation would
result in excessive prices and too little musical output, Congress
created the compulsory license for mechanical reproductions of
339. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2671 & n.62 (1994) (citing ALI KOHN & BOB KOHN, THE ART OF MUSIC LICENSING
310-11 (1992)).
340. See id.
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songs.341 Thereafter, once producers recorded and released a copy-
righted musical composition to the public, other companies would be
able to record the same song with their own musicians upon the
payment of a predetermined fee to the owner of the composition.
In our terms, the story of the mechanical license illustrates an
attempt to increase the amount of borrowing by reducing its costs.
Congress was concerned that innovating would be too difficult for
Aeolian’s competitors, because they would have to create their own
musical compositions to record. Congress was also worried about
Aeolian’s—probably imaginary, or at least transitory—monopsony
power as a dominant force in the market for purchasing licenses to
produce player piano rolls’ reproductions of popular musical compo-
sitions. The combination of expensive designing around plus
elevated prices from lack of competition stirred Congress to find a
solution that would make borrowing easier. Here, it involved an
alteration to the way in which copyrights are protected—by a liabil-
ity rule for cover songs rather than a property rule.342
In much of the rest of copyright law, however, legal rules will
often push downstream creators towards building around rather
than building on. The combination of copyright’s broad derivative
works right and the idea/expression distinction makes attempting
to license upstream works less appealing. As we described above,
the derivative works right gives upstream creators control over
almost all of the downstream uses of their work.343 Subsequent
creators must license upstream rights prior to developing their own
works, or they risk losing their efforts and being sued for copyright
infringement. The idea/expression distinction further enhances the
appeal of designing around existing works, because it limits the up-
stream authors’ control to their particular expressions rather than
to the generic ideas underlying them.344 Thus, while the derivative
works right discourages downstream creators from developing their
own Star Trek stories, the idea/expression doctrine enables them to
produce other science fiction works.
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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This regime for channeling sequential innovation makes sense
from the perspective of certain assumptions that policymakers could
hold. Copyright law grants the originator of a character or storyline
the opportunity to work out that story’s trajectory without the
interference of others and without fear of being blocked from
particular paths if she does not get to them first.345 But it also allows
other authors the opportunity to create within the same genre
without fear of liability.346 The high degree of building around that
will result may be optimal if policymakers believe that original
authors are best positioned to direct the future uses of their
works,347 and that the public is best served by having lots of dif-
ferent works within the same genre rather than lots of versions of
the same work.348 Note that we express no opinion on whether these
statements are true as empirical matters. We merely seek to explain
the presumptions about the desirable mix of building on and
building around that are built into current copyright doctrine, and
how regulators can manipulate IP laws to produce different mixes
of building on and building around based on their goals.
Second, although it may be attractive for policymakers to change
IP regimes in order to optimize innovation and creativity, they have
to be attentive to unintended consequences of such changes. Consid-
er a situation in which copyright law altered its rules with respect
to attribution, or the author’s right to be named as the creator of a
work. Currently, U.S. copyright law does not provide authors with
a default right to attribution, unlike many European countries.349
Instead, if authors desire attribution when they license their works
to others, they must contract for it.350 Thus, if a band licenses its
song to be used in a commercial, it must specifically request that its
name appear in the ad.351 If copyright law switched this default,
giving authors the initial right to attribution, but allowing them to
345. For example, Harper Lee’s copyright in To Kill a Mockingbird entitled her to take as
long as she needed to continue to tell her story in a subsequent novel. See Abramowicz, supra
note 123, at 325-26.
346. See id.
347. See Kitch, supra note 336, at 266.
348. See Beebe, supra note 306, at 391-93.
349. See Stefan Bechtold & Christoph Engel, The Valuation of Moral Rights: A Field
Experiment 2-3 (Mar. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
350. On the preferences of U.S. and European authors for attribution rights, see id. at 21.
351. See id.
74 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:001
sell it, there should be little economic difference in outcomes.
Whenever authors value attribution more than licensees value not
providing it, attribution will occur, and vice versa. The small shift
in the default legal regime should not make much of a difference.
But as recent experimental evidence by Sprigman, Buccafusco,
and Burns shows, changing the default rights for attribution could
produce enormous behavioral differences.352 Because of the “sticki-
ness” of the status quo and people’s aversion to selling things that
they own, authors are likely to demand substantially more to part
with attribution than they would have been willing to pay to obtain
it.353 The endowment effect generates a behavioral bias that is much
stronger than the simple change in legal rules would have predicted
as a matter of economic theory.354 Accordingly, because authors with
a default attribution right will demand higher prices to license their
works, we may see less building on and more building around in the
downstream market. Returning to our example, the advertising
agency will be more likely to commission its own music or use public
domain music than to license existing copyrighted music.
Third, although it may be attractive for policymakers to change
IP regimes in order to optimize innovation and creativity, such
changes may sometimes have little effect when other factors domin-
ate creators’ O/A decisions. Consider the result when U.S. copyright
law extended protection to architectural works in 1990, and the
legal entitlement structure for these works changed dramatically.355
This change, however, likely had no effect at all on the pace or
direction of sequential innovation.356 Considered from a legal point
of view, this seems startling: an entire class of works, all of a
sudden, began to receive copyright protection, and building on what
previously would have been entirely legal would now constitute
infringement.357 But considered in light of the other factors that
352. See Christopher Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco, & Zachary Burns, What’s a
Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 1389, 1431 (2013).
353. See id. at 1393.
354. See id. at 1396.
355. See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089, 5133 (1990).
356. David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at Twenty: Has
Full Protection Made a Difference?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 59 (2010).
357. See id.
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influence creators’ O/A decisions, it makes complete sense. Market
factors suggest that consumer demand—in this case, the purchasers
of works of high-end architecture—often desire novelty.358 It is the
rare builder of a concert hall or high-rise who is content to construct
one very similar to a neighbor’s. In addition, technological factors
relating to the difficulty of copying others’ designs augur strongly in
favor of building around instead of building on. Unlike a novel,
where the costs of original creative effort are high relative to the
costs of producing copies of the work, in architectural works, the
costs of constructing the building are often much greater than the
designers’ creative costs. Moreover, actually copying existing works
is difficult—architectural works are not digital files that can be
reproduced at the touch of a button.
On the other hand, with respect to mass-market architecture,
such as the design of suburban tract houses and strip malls, the
introduction of copyright also has had little effect, but this time the
dominant mode is building on.359 Consumers of mass-market archi-
tecture have little taste for novelty—most want their houses and
commercial buildings to blend with the structures already existing
in the community.360 If you believe that the law has a tight and
singular relationship to incentives, following the introduction of
copyright, we should have seen an outpouring of design creativity in
mass-market architecture. We have not, because consumer tastes
for building on predominate over the change in legal rules.361 We
suspect that many other fields will share important similarities
with architectural works, where changes in the structure of IP
entitlements will produce little effect on downstream creators’
innovation behavior. Market, technological, and creator factors will
influence creators more strongly than the scope of legal protection.
To the extent that this contention is true, it has important implica-
tions for attempts to regulate sequential innovation. Policymakers
often attempt to manipulate actors’ behavior by altering the struc-
ture of legal entitlements. But when legal entitlements are not the
358. See id. at 6.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. Most of the litigation surrounding architectural works involves mass-market housing
that emerges from contract disputes. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 216-17 (8th ed.
2010).
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strongest catalysts for people’s behavior, changing them will not do
much good—or much damage. New legislation will be mostly wasted
effort.
Fourth, before policymakers change IP regimes in order to
optimize innovation and creativity, they should consider whether
other regulatory interventions outside IP law would be more
effective or less costly. Varying IP doctrines may not be the most
efficient way for policymakers to affect creators’ behavior. The
standard account of sequential innovation by IP scholars treats IP
law as the chief determinant of creator behavior.362 Likewise, it
treats changes in IP doctrine as the principle mechanism to regulate
sequential behavior.363 Thus, altering the length and breadth of IP
rights can regulate the pace or path of sequential innovation. Our
analysis in Parts II through V indicates, however, that many factors
other than IP doctrine will influence the nature of sequential
innovation. Technological, market, and creator factors will often
shape creators’ decisions as much as the current state of IP law. In
many—perhaps most—cases, IP law may play no role at all in
creative output.364 In a large percentage of the remaining cases, the
influence of the other factors will swamp the effect of a change in
legal entitlements.365 While the legal change might increase or de-
crease the costs of building around, those costs will be inframarginal
for many creators and innovators, and sequential innovation will
not be affected.366
For example, if legislators believe that a given creative field
involves wasteful designing around, and want to encourage down-
stream creators to build on existing ideas, they might consider
opportunities for altering other aspects of the O/A decision. As we
noted above, one way to encourage building on is to reduce transac-
362. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 338 (“The more difficult it is for copiers
to avoid infringing the author’s copyright by substituting other inputs for the protected part
of the author’s work, because the protected part is bigger, the larger will be the increase in
the copiers’ marginal cost.”).
363. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 8, at 1056; Merges & Nelson, supra note 8, at 868.
364. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 277 (2015) (noting that IP law rarely plays a role in creators’ initial
decisions about whether and how to create).
365. See id.
366. See id.
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tion costs between upstream and downstream creators.367 Perhaps
the legislature could find ways of lowering the costs of sharing
information or of creating opportunities for upstream and down-
stream creators to find one another. Or imagine a situation in which
regulators are concerned that too few firms own the patent rights to
a valuable technology, and that the small number of suppliers of
upstream rights is compelling downstream firms to wastefully
design around those rights. The government could attempt to pur-
chase all or most of the upstream patents and license them to
downstream firms to reduce the costs of building on. If one firm
owned the patents to a valuable medical treatment, for example, the
government could purchase those patents and agree to license them
to other firms at lower rates than the upstream firm was charging.
While this might be expensive for the government in the short term,
operating as a de facto patent pool could ultimately avoid wasteful
duplicative research and speed the development of improvements.
This solution, which involves a manipulation of the market factors
that influence O/A decisions, could be more efficient than a whole-
sale alteration of patent law. Or imagine that a policymaker wants
to encourage creative reuse of computer code in order to facilitate a
flourishing software industry. Rather than fine-tune patent and
copyright protection for computer software, it may be more effective
to focus on labor laws and employee mobility, thereby facilitating
the free flow of tacit knowledge.368 Or think of a technological area
367. See supra Part II.A.2.
368. This is, arguably, the story of Silicon Valley. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL AD-
VANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 35 (1994); Ronald
J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley,
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577 (1999); Matt Marx,
Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experi-
ment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875, 887 (2009); Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-Compete Agreements:
Barriers to Entry ... and Exit?, 12 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 33, 54 (Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2012); Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh & Lee Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Employee
Non-Compete Agreements and Brain Drain, 44 RES. POL’Y 394, 403 (2015). On antitrust
investigations and class action lawsuits in which Silicon Valley firms agreed to restrain the
lateral hiring of high-tech employees, see United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10-CV-1629,
2011 WL 10883994, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2011) (enforcing the settlement between the
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and several Silicon Valley companies); In re High-
Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2015 WL 5159441, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
2, 2015) (approving class action settlement among Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, and some of
their employees); and In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1214
(N.D. Cal. 2015).
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that builds on the combination of many innovative inputs. In such
area, policymakers should think twice before attempting to encour-
age sequential innovation through patent law. This may be an
ineffective strategy because high transaction costs will impede the
necessary license agreements. Rather, policymakers should consider
turning to tax incentives in order to create ex post rewards for
sequential innovation.369
This is not to suggest that legislators should always regulate
innovation through non-IP factors. It might be incredibly difficult,
for example, for legislators to shift consumer demand for built on
versus built around works. Regulating consumer taste will often be
challenging. For some of the factors discussed in this Article, it may
also be more complicated for legislators to gather reliable informa-
tion on how they impact sequential innovation, compared to other
factors.370 Instead, we suggest that policymakers consider the full
range of factors that influence O/A decisions to determine which
ones provide the most efficient and reliable means for affecting
outcomes. This will involve considerations of comparative institu-
tional competence, the costs and benefits of regulating creative
fields collectively or independently, and the likelihood of positive
and negative externalities to regulation.371 But ultimately, the
framework that we offer here promises to make regulating sequen-
tial innovation more efficient and successful.
Our multifactor approach to sequential innovation begins the
process of expanding policymakers’ regulatory toolkit—although, as
we have emphasized throughout this Article, a lot of work remains
to be done before regulatory interventions are much more than a
shot in the dark. Instead of focusing solely on variations in copy-
right and patent laws to influence creators’ behavior, legislators,
judges, and scholars should consider manipulating the full range of
factors that affect creators. This is, foremost, an endeavor that re-
quires policymakers to gather a substantial amount of information.
Such information includes the maturity of the technology in the
369. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 147, at 377-78 (arguing that the field of battery
technology meets these criteria).
370. See supra Part VI.B.
371. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 300
(2007).
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relevant market; input substitutability; the role that tacit knowl-
edge, business practices, and market intermediaries play in the
industry; consumer preferences for novelty; and the ability of
innovators to make accurate O/A decisions. Only by considering how
these and other factors interact will policymakers be able to make
an informed decision on whether they should change IP doctrines.
CONCLUSION
This Article has provided a new way to conceptualize the nature
of sequential innovation and its relationship to law. Regulating
sequential innovation is not merely a matter of manipulating the
scope of IP laws but instead requires a rich understanding of the
multiple factors that influence the behaviors of creators and
inventors. If scholars and policymakers aim to optimize cumulative
innovation, they should not merely strive for optimizing copyright
or patent law. Rather, they should analyze the complex interaction
between IP law and contextual factors that enable more targeted
and effective regulatory interventions.
